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The Fatal Flaws of the “Sneak 
and Peek” Statute and How 
to Fix It 
Jonathan Witmer-Rich† 
Abstract 
In the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress authorized delayed notice 
search warrants—warrants authorizing a “sneak and peek” search, in 
which investigators conduct covert searches, notifying the occupant 
weeks or months after the search. These warrants also sometimes 
authorize covert seizures—a “sneak and steal” search—in which 
investigators seize evidence, often staging the scene to look like a 
burglary.  
Covert searches invade the privacy of the home and should be used 
only in exceptional cases. The current legal rules governing delayed 
notice search warrants are conceptually flawed. The statute uses a legal 
doctrine—“exigent circumstances”—that does not make logical sense 
when applied to covert searching of physical spaces because it permits 
investigators to manufacture a justification for a covert search in almost 
any case. Covert searches without sufficient justification run afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment’s “rule requiring notice” and are 
constitutionally unreasonable.  
When confronted with a request for a covert search, courts should 
ask, “Why is it so important to do a covert search now, while the 
investigation is still ongoing, rather than a public search later, once 
police are ready to seize the evidence and arrest the suspects?” But the 
statute does not pose that question. Instead, the statute merely prompts 
courts to ask, “Assuming police conduct a search now but choose not 
to arrest anyone or seize the relevant evidence, will giving notice of the 
search likely lead to the destruction of evidence, escape of suspects, or 
otherwise seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation?” Viewed this 
way, it is readily apparent that the answer will almost always be yes. 
Stated differently, courts should be asking whether a proposed 
covert search is necessary—whether conducting a covert search is the 
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only way to obtain evidence that cannot reasonably be obtained 
through conventional (and less invasive) investigative techniques.  
This Article explains this conceptual error and addresses other flaws 
in the current statute. It then proposes new legislation that would fix 
the problems and properly regulate the invasive practice of covert 
searches and seizures. 
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Introduction 
In the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress gave the executive a variety 
of tools to fight terrorism. One tool was the delayed notice search 
warrant—a warrant authorizing a “sneak and peek” search, in which 
investigators could conduct covert searches, notifying the occupant 
weeks or months after the search.1 These warrants also sometimes 
authorize covert seizures—a “sneak and steal” search—in which 
investigators seize evidence during a covert search, often staging the 
scene to look like a burglary to keep the government seizure a secret.2  
From the start, these “sneak and peek” warrants were not limited 
to terrorism investigations—they apply to any criminal investigation.3 
The statute permits a conventional search—with notice to the 
occupant—to be converted to a covert search if the police can show 
exigent circumstances.4 
This approach is fundamentally flawed. Regulating covert searches 
through the rubric of “exigent circumstances” constitutes a basic 
conceptual error. The statute effectively authorizes police to opt for a 
covert search, rather than a traditional search, whenever they find it 
convenient or helpful. The current standard gives police almost 
unlimited power to manufacture a justification for a covert search. This 
plainly was not Congress’s intent in the USA PATRIOT Act.  
When confronted with a request for a covert search, courts should 
ask, “Why is it so important to do a covert search now, while the 
investigation is still ongoing, rather than a public search later, once 
police are ready to seize the evidence and arrest the suspects?” But the  
1. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA 
PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 213 (2001). See also 
James B. Comey, Fighting Terrorism and Preserving Civil Liberties, 40 
U. Rich. L. Rev. 403, 410 (2006) (defending “sneak and peek” searches). 
2. USA PATRIOT Act § 213. See 147 Cong. Rec. S20,683 (daily ed. Oct. 
25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (referring to seizure provision as 
“sneak and steal”); Brett A. Shumate, From “Sneak and Peek” to “Sneak 
and Steal”: Section 213 of the USA Patriot Act, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 
203 (2006). 
3. See USA PATRIOT Act § 213; Admin.’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 39–41 
(2001) [hereinafter Admin.’s Draft] (statements of Rep. Bachus and 
Assistant Att’y Gen. Michael Chertoff) (noting that § 352 of the proposed 
legislation—now § 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act—applied to all criminal 
investigations, not just terrorism investigations); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, 
The Rapid Rise of Delayed Notice Searches, and the Fourth Amendment 
“Rule Requiring Notice,” 41 Pepp. L. Rev. 509, 526 (2014) (detailing 
the legislative history of the delayed notice search warrant provision). 
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a (2013) (permitting a covert search if notice will 
cause an “adverse result”); 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2013) (defining “adverse 
result” to effectively mean exigent circumstances). 
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statute does not pose that question. Instead, the statute merely prompts 
courts to ask, “Assuming police conduct a search now but choose not 
to arrest anyone or seize the relevant evidence, will giving notice of the 
search likely lead to the destruction of evidence, escape of suspects, or 
otherwise seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation?” Viewed this 
way, it is readily apparent that the answer will almost always be yes.  
Stated differently, courts should be asking whether a proposed 
covert search is necessary (as that term is used in the context of 
wiretapping under Title III)—whether conducting a covert search is the 
only way to obtain evidence that cannot reasonably be obtained 
through conventional (and less invasive) investigative techniques.  
The “sneak and peek” statute is thus plagued with a fundamental 
error. By choosing the concept of “exigency” rather than “necessity,” 
Congress failed to achieve its stated goal of creating a uniform national 
standard that would provide clear legal authority for covert searching, 
while limiting the practice to unusual cases of exceptional importance.5 
In 2005, Congress passed a reporting requirement meant to track the 
number of “sneak and peek” searches conducted annually.6 
Unfortunately, the data on “sneak and peek” searches appear to include 
information on other types of searches—such as GPS tracking, cell 
phone location searches, and covert searches of  
e-mail—making it impossible to determine the frequency of “sneak and 
peek” searches.7  
By creating such a lenient standard, Congress also created 
constitutional problems. A covert search represents a deviation from 
the Fourth Amendment’s “rule requiring notice”—the presumption 
that contemporaneous notice is required for a search to be 
“reasonable.”8 The current statutory standard fails to adequately justify 
 
5. See Admin.’s Draft, supra note 3, at 41. In a White Paper issued in 2004, 
the DOJ stated that section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act “simply 
established a uniform national standard” for delayed notice search 
warrants and that it permits delayed notice warrants “only in extremely 
narrow circumstances.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Delayed Notice 
Search Warrants: A Vital and Time-Honored Tool for Fighting 
Crime 3–4 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/10/17/patriotact213report.pdf 
[hereinafter DNSW White Paper]. 
6. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 530–31 (explaining the reporting 
requirement); H.R. Rep. No. 109-333, at 20 (2005) (requiring judges to 
report all applications for delayed notice search warrants, the number 
granted or denied, the period of delay, and the offenses specified in the 
warrant application). 
7. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 531–49 (explaining the flaws in the 
reporting requirement and why the reports produced fail to provide 
meaningful information on the use of “sneak and peek” warrants). 
8. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (“[T]he common law of 
search and seizure recognized a law enforcement officer’s authority to 
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deviating from this Fourth Amendment baseline, rendering covert 
searches under the existing statute unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
Covert searches and seizures must be effectively regulated because 
they impose serious privacy intrusions. Covert government searches of 
homes and businesses intrude into the heart of Fourth Amendment 
protection—the privacy and sanctity of the home. The practice of 
covert searching diminishes the privacy of the entire community 
because no one knows when or if the government has searched their 
private spaces. As Justice Sotomayor has recently pointed out, 
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills associational 
and expressive freedoms.”9  
Covert seizures carry additional risks. When police want to both 
seize evidence and keep the search and seizure secret, they ordinarily 
stage the seizure to resemble a burglary.10 Thus, the occupants believe 
they have been burglarized by unknown criminals rather than targeted 
by a government criminal investigation. If the occupants are violent 
criminals, there is a serious risk that they will retaliate against someone 
they suspect of having committed the burglary. The current “sneak and 
peek” statute, which authorizes covert seizures as well, does not appear 
to recognize this risk and does nothing to force investigators and courts 
to justify and mitigate the risk of harm to third parties. 
It is not surprising that the “sneak and peek” statute—enacted 
quickly, as one small part of the USA PATRIOT Act, and with minimal 
deliberation—is conceptually flawed. This Article explains the core 
problems with the statute and proposes new legislation that would fix 
these errors. Grounding covert searches in the concept of “necessity” 
rather than just “exigency” would effectively limit this invasive practice 
and would go a long way toward rendering covert searching 
constitutionally reasonable. 
Part I examines both the costs and benefits of covert searching with 
delayed notice search warrants. Part II examines the concepts of 
“necessity” and “exigent circumstances,” surveying their constitutional 
origins and differences and establishing a conceptual framework for 
evaluating the sneak and peek statute. Part III uses this framework to 
explain why the rules set forth in the current statute—18 U.S.C. § 
3103a—are fatally flawed. Section 3103a uses the concept of “exigent 
circumstances”—a doctrine that totally fails to effectively regulate and  
break open the doors of a dwelling, but generally indicated that he first 
ought to announce his presence and authority. . . . [This] principle forms 
a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.”); 
Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 (1822) (referring to this common law 
principle as the “rule requiring notice”); Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 
570–85. 
9. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
10. See Shumate, supra note 2, at 222–31. 
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limit the practice of covert searching with delayed notice search 
warrants. Because § 3103a permits covert searching without requiring 
a sufficient showing to justify bypassing the Fourth Amendment 
baseline of notice, covert searching under § 3103a amounts to an 
unreasonable search. 
Part IV proposes a solution, invoking the concept of “necessity”—
that covert searching should be permitted only as a last resort when 
conventional Fourth Amendment search techniques are not sufficient. 
Courts should require investigators to make this “necessity” showing in 
order to conclude that a delayed notice search is “reasonable” under 
the Fourth Amendment. Part IV also suggests additional limitations to 
covert searching with delayed notice warrants, such as requiring prior 
authorization from a high-level DOJ official. 
Part V turns to the unique dangers involved in covert seizures—
“sneak and steal” cases. Part V explains how “sneak and steal” searches 
create serious risks of physical danger to innocent third parties—risks 
not recognized or regulated by the current statute.  
Part VI proposes specific revisions to § 3103a that would effectively 
regulate the practice of covert searching and covert seizures, limiting 
covert searches to cases of true necessity and taking into account the 
unique dangers posed by delayed notice search warrants. Covert 
searches and seizures under the new limitations of this statute would 
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
I. Covert Searches of Physical Spaces: 
Costs and Benefits 
Before analyzing the delayed notice statute, § 3103a, it is important 
to consider the costs and benefits of covert searching. At the outset, a 
clarification is in order: Delayed notice searches occur in several 
different contexts. During the debate over § 352 of the USA PATRIOT 
Act,11 legislators focused on covert searching in the traditional Fourth 
Amendment context: searches of physical spaces, like homes and 
businesses.12 But § 3103a creates a mechanism for delaying notice for 
 
11. The delayed notice search provisions originally appeared in § 352 of the 
proposed legislation. Later versions moved the delayed notice search 
provisions to § 213. USA PATRIOT Act § 213.  
12. See, e.g., Admin.’s Draft, supra note 3, at 40 (statement of Michael 
Chertoff, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div.) (“I 
can tell you from my own personal experience that there are circumstances 
in which you need to be able to go into a location and search . . . [b]ut 
you cannot give notice or wind up alerting people who may be very 
dangerous.”); id. at 41 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus) (“[Y]ou’re 
applying this [delayed notice] to all cases where you want to search 
someone’s home.”); 147 Cong. Rec. S19,502 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“Normally, when law enforcement 
officers execute a search warrant, they must leave a copy of the warrant 
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any type of search warrant, not just warrants involving searches of 
physical spaces. For example, delayed notice search warrants are 
sometimes used to conduct GPS monitoring, to obtain cell phone 
location information, or to obtain e-mail or other electronic data from 
third-party service providers.13 
At one level, all of these searches share a similarity: all involve the 
government obtaining information with a warrant that expressly 
provides that the search in question shall be conducted secretly and not 
disclosed until some later date. In another sense, there is a fundamental 
difference between covert searches of physical spaces, on the one hand, 
and covert government surveillance or data-gathering from nonphysical 
sources, on the other.  
A government search of a physical space, such as a home, is the 
paradigmatic Fourth Amendment intrusion.14 There is no dispute that 
these types of searches implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests. 
And, as noted below, searches of physical spaces that are conducted 
covertly raise a specific set of concerns related to the privacy and 
sanctity of the home. 
In contrast, government surveillance—such as GPS tracking or 
obtaining cell phone location information—raises a related but distinct 
set of concerns. Until recently, this type of surveillance was not thought 
to implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests at all.15 In recent 
years, courts have begun to suggest that some forms of covert tracking 
 
and a receipt for all property seized at the premises searched. Thus, even 
if the search occurs when the owner of the premises is not present, the 
owner will receive notice that the premises have been lawfully searched 
pursuant to a warrant rather than, for example, burglarized.”); 147 Cong. 
Rec. S20,702 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Russell 
Feingold) (“Notice is a key element of fourth amendment 
protections. . . . If . . . the police have received permission to do a ‘sneak 
and peek’ search, they can come in your house, look around, and leave, 
and may never have to tell you that ever happened. That bothers me. I 
bet it bothers most Americans.”). 
13. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 539–49 (explaining how § 3103a applies 
to delayed notice searches of nonphysical spaces). 
14. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589–90 (1980) (The language of the 
Fourth Amendment “unequivocally establishes the proposition that ‘[a]t 
the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental instruction.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Silverman 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 642–
43 (1999) (arguing that even though “modern courts apply the Fourth 
Amendment to all privately owned property . . . contemporary cases still 
acknowledge that the house was meant to receive special protection”).  
15. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 542–44, 547–48. 
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and monitoring do raise Fourth Amendment concerns.16 The precise 
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment in this area remain unsettled.  
Likewise, government searches of nonphysical spaces—such as 
obtaining e-mail messages or other electronic data from a third-party 
service provider—also fall into a Fourth Amendment gray area. For 
many years, the government was able to covertly obtain much of this 
information without a search warrant, simply by using a subpoena or 
court order that did not have to include all the elements of a traditional 
Fourth Amendment warrant.17 More recently, courts have begun 
imposing Fourth Amendment warrant requirements on some of these 
areas as well.18 
The focus of this Article is on covert searches of physical spaces. 
Other forms of covert searching, such as government surveillance and 
searches of digital information, raise a different set of concerns that fall 
outside the scope of this Article. My criticisms of the existing delayed 
notice search warrant statute and my proposals for reform thus focus 
on the context of covert searches of physical spaces. 
A. Covert Searches Impose Serious Privacy Costs and Implicate 
Core Fourth Amendment Interests. 
In a previous article, I argued that covert searching infringes on 
privacy interests and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against “unreasonable” searches and seizures.19 These concerns show 
why it is important to reserve covert searching to rare cases of 
exceptional importance. 
Covert searching intrudes directly into the privacy and sanctity of 
the home, the values at the heart of the Fourth Amendment. “At the 
 
16. Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (holding 
that the installation of a tracking device on a car to conduct GPS location 
monitoring constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment); In re 
Application of U.S. for Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Comm. Service 
to Disclose Records, 620 F.3d 304, 312 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing cases holding 
that the government must use search warrants to obtain various types of 
cell phone location data, and cases holding to the contrary); In re 
Application of U.S. for Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), C.R. No. 
C-13-497M, 964 F. Supp. 2d 674 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2013) (holding that 
government was required to show probable cause to obtain historical cell 
site information and citing cases holding that probable cause and the 
Fourth Amendment do not apply to historical cell site data and cases 
holding the contrary). 
17. Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 545. 
18. Id.; see also United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010). 
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court appeared to assume—without 
squarely addressing the question—that data held by third-party providers 
on “the cloud” are presumptively protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
19. Witmer-Rich, supra note 3. 
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very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion.”20 Every government search of the home 
invades into this protected space, yet the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit all intrusions into the home—only unreasonable ones. As 
provided by the Fourth Amendment, intrusions into the home are 
justified when a neutral magistrate finds individual probable cause.21  
The physical intrusion into the home is the same whether a search 
is conducted covertly or with notice to the occupant—and that 
intrusion is justified by the warrant, whether it is a delayed notice 
warrant or not. But the covert nature of an otherwise justified search 
raises additional privacy concerns independent of the fact of the 
physical search. 
A covert search causes feelings of distress and loss of privacy when 
the occupants learn the government secretly searched through their 
home. In United States v. Freitas,22 the Ninth Circuit stated that 
“surreptitious searches and seizures of intangibles strike at the very 
heart of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment” because 
“[t]he mere thought of strangers walking through and visually 
examining the center of our privacy interest, our home, arouses our 
passion for freedom as does nothing else.”23  
A homeowner suffers a different loss of privacy and control over 
their property when that property is searched covertly than when it is 
searched in the homeowner’s presence. A homeowner who is present 
during a search can see what the police are doing, where they search, 
what, if anything, they take, and what, if any, damage they cause.24 A 
 
20. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). See also Semayne’s 
Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.) (referring to the ancient 
common law principle that “the house of every one is to him as 
his . . . castle and fortress, as well for his defence [sic] against injury and 
violence, as for his repose”). 
21. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 123 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing Semayne’s Case) (“At least since 1604 it has been 
settled that in the absence of exigent circumstances, a government agent 
has no right to enter a ‘house’ or ‘castle’ unless authorized to do so by a 
valid warrant.”). 
22. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).  
23. Id. at 1456. 
24. Because police have the power to detain occupants during a search 
authorized by a warrant, the opportunity to observe the entire search may 
be substantially limited. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 
(1981) (“[A] warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of 
the premises while a proper search is conducted.”). Nevertheless, an 
occupant present during a search still has some limited opportunity to see 
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homeowner who later learns of a covert search can only imagine what 
the search involved and which parts of her private space have been 
violated. 
A covert search also invites abuse. As early as 1628, Sir Edward 
Coke warned that “if a man’s house could be searched while he was 
confined without being told the cause, ‘they will find cause enough’”25—
perhaps inventing evidence if it is not present. 
Finally, the practice of covert government searches exacts what 
might be called a “privacy tax” on the entire community. When a 
government conducts covert searches of its own citizens, and citizens 
begin to learn of that practice, individuals in the community logically 
begin to wonder whether their home has been secretly invaded. Each 
person in the community, regardless of whether they have been targeted 
or not, suffers the uncertainty of not knowing whether the government 
has violated their privacy. 
This uncertainty can have serious repercussions. In a different 
Fourth Amendment context, Justice Sotomayor recently observed that 
“[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills associational 
and expressive freedoms.”26 In United States v. Di Re, the Court 
explained that “the forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history, 
designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too 
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a 
greater danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from 
punishment.”27  
Secret government surveillance (of which covert searching is one 
manifestation) is used by totalitarian governments not merely to find 
incriminating evidence of dissent, but also to prevent citizens from 
pursuing dissent in the first place by instilling the fear that big brother 
is always watching. “[A] totalitarian government engages in systematic, 
often covert surveillance of its populace, ‘penetrating,’ in Mill’s words, 
ever ‘more deeply into the details of life,’ with the object of ‘enslaving 
the soul.’”28 Professor Neil Richards explains that “[t]he most salient 
 
what the police are doing and what they are taking—far more so than a 
person not present during the search.  
25. William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and 
Original Meaning 602–1791, at 141 (2009) (citing Commons Debates 
1628, at 159 (Robert C. Johnson et al. eds., 1997)). 
26. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  
27. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). Justice Sotomayor, 
quoting Di Re, recently recognized “the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb 
arbitrary exercises of police power to and prevent ‘a too permeating police 
surveillance.’” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (quoting Di Re, 332 U.S. at 595). 
28. Jed Rubenfeld, Privacy’s End, in Law and Democracy in the Empire 
of Force 217 (H. Jefferson Powell & James Boyd White eds., 2009) 
(quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 13 (photo. reprint 2002) 
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harm of surveillance is that it threatens . . . ‘intellectual privacy’”—the 
idea “that new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny 
of public exposure; that people should be able to make up their minds 
at times and places of their own choosing; and that a meaningful 
guarantee of privacy—protection from surveillance or interference—is 
necessary to promote this kind of intellectual freedom.”29 
These costs of covert searching suggest that the practice should 
either be forbidden or be permitted only in extraordinary cases, under 
careful oversight, and only when justified by sufficiently compelling 
government interests.  
B. The DOJ’s Examples for Why the Existing Statute 
Is Needed Are Not Fully Convincing.  
Because covert searching involves a serious privacy invasion, the 
practice requires both a compelling government justification as well as 
effective oversight and legal constraints. Before turning to evaluate the 
present constraints, it is important to determine whether there is any 
sufficiently compelling government interest to justify any practice of 
covert searching.  
There appears to be clear value to investigators in having the option 
of conducting a covert search—being able to acquire important 
information (or physical evidence) while continuing the investigation 
without the knowledge of the suspect. The Department of Justice has 
argued that covert searching under § 3103a is a “vital aspect” of its 
counterterrorism and criminal law enforcement efforts.30  
There are at least two reasons to be somewhat skeptical of this 
claim. First, in the counterterrorism context, § 3103a is not the only 
source of covert search authority—investigators can already conduct 
covert searches under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 
Thus, in the most compelling context—counterterrorism—§ 3103a is 
simply an additional tool to already-existing authority. Second, it is 
instructive to closely examine some of the examples the DOJ itself has 
given to show why § 3103a is needed. Many of these examples raise 
 
(1859)). A detailed and chilling description of how the fear of constant 
surveillance in a totalitarian state destroys personal privacy, even within 
families, appears in Adam Johnson’s Pulitzer Prize–winning novel, The 
Orphan Master’s Son. Adam Johnson, The Orphan Master’s Son 
(2012). 
29. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1934, 
1945 (2013). See also Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1904, 1905 (2013) (“Privacy shelters dynamic, emergent subjectivity 
from the efforts of commercial and government actors to render 
individuals and communities fixed, transparent, and predictable. It 
protects the situated practices of boundary management through which 
the capacity for self-determination develops.”). 
30. DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 3. 
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some doubts about how often covert searching under § 3103a is a critical 
law enforcement tool. 
In the end, there may be some cases in which covert search 
authority is justified, but that authority should be substantially 
curtailed to limit covert searching to truly extraordinary circumstances 
of compelling government necessity.  
1. FISA Already Authorizes Covert Searches in Some Cases 
Involving International Terrorist Threats. 
While the “sneak and peek” statute was never limited to terrorism 
investigations, the DOJ has consistently invoked counterterrorism as 
the area in which covert search authority is most important and 
compelling. Speaking of the USA PATRIOT Act as a whole, Attorney 
General John Ashcroft testified on September 24, 2001, that the 
proposed legislation would “provide law enforcement with the tools 
necessary to identify, dismantle, disrupt and punish terrorist 
organizations before they strike again.”31 Deputy Attorney General 
James Comey, testifying during the 2004 debate over the PATRIOT 
Act reauthorization, stated that the PATRIOT Act “provided our 
nation’s law enforcement, national defense, and intelligence personnel 
with enhanced and vital new tools to prevent future terrorist attacks 
and bring terrorists and other dangerous criminals to justice.”32 As for 
delayed notice warrants in particular, Comey testified as follows:  
Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act codified and made nationally 
consistent an existing and important tool by expressly authorizing 
courts to issue delayed notification search warrants. Court-
authorized delayed-notice search warrants are a vital aspect of 
the Justice Department’s strategy of prevention—detecting and 
incapacitating terrorists before they are able to strike.33 
Section 213 is not the only source of covert search authority in 
counterterrorism investigations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) authorizes covert physical searches of terrorists operating 
on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations. FISA, usually discussed in 
 
31. Admin.’s Draft, supra note 3, at 4 (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y 
Gen. of the United States).  
32. A Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Proposals, Including the 
USA PATRIOT Act and the SAFE Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 154 (2004) [hereinafter Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation and Proposals] (statement of James Comey, Deputy Att’y 
Gen. of the United States).  
33. Id. at 157. 
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the context of electronic surveillance, contains express statutory 
authority for covert searches of physical spaces as well.34  
Section 1822 authorizes federal agents to conduct physical searches 
based either on the authorization of the President or based on an order 
from the FISA Court.35 These FISA physical searches are presumptively 
covert—there is no provision requiring contemporary notice of the 
search. On the contrary, the law specifically empowers federal agents 
to obtain any necessary information or assistance from third parties 
(such as landlords) as may be “necessary to accomplish the physical 
search in such a manner as will protect its secrecy . . . .”36 
The statute provides for notice to the occupant only in two 
circumstances: (1) where the search involved the residence of a United 
States person, notice shall be given only if and when the Attorney 
General “determines there is no national security interest in continuing 
to maintain the secrecy of the search”37; or (2) when prosecutors intend 
to use FISA-obtained evidence against a defendant in a criminal 
prosecution, prosecutors must give notice to the defendant of the search 
and its fruits.38 
To obtain a FISA physical search order, federal agents must show, 
among other things, that “the target of the physical search is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power”39—terms that include those 
working on behalf of foreign governments and foreign terrorist 
organizations.40 The search must be to obtain “foreign intelligence 
information”41—a term that includes information relating to 
international terrorism or the national security of the United States.42 
Thus, in the context of terrorist threats from persons acting within 
the United States on behalf of a foreign terrorist organization or foreign 
government, FISA authorizes covert searches on the basis of 
 
34. Part of Chapter 36 of Title 50 relates to “physical searches.” See generally 
Daniel J. Malooly, Note, Physical Searches Under FISA: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 411 (1998). 
35. 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a) (2012) (Presidential authorization); § 1822(b) (2012) 
(FISA Court orders). 
36. 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(B) (2012). See also 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(4) (2012) 
(providing the same authority for searches ordered by the Attorney 
General acting on presidential authorization rather than a FISA Court 
order). 
37. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (2011). 
38. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(e) (2011). 
39. 50 U.S.C. § 1823(a)(3)(A) (2012); § 1824(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a), (b) (2012) (defining “foreign power” and “agent of a 
foreign power”). 
41. 50 U.S.C. § 1823(a)(3)(B) (2012).  
42. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2012) (defining “foreign intelligence information”). 
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presidential authorization (in certain circumstances) or a secret FISA 
Court order. Unlike covert searches under § 3103a, these FISA covert 
searches usually remain secret indefinitely—until the evidence is used 
in a criminal prosecution or the Attorney General determines there is 
“no national security interest” in continued secrecy—a high bar to 
disclosure. The FISA covert search authority is independent of the 
covert search authority in § 3103a of Title 18. 
Of course, not all terrorism investigations involve foreign 
organizations. The FISA covert search authority hinges on showing a 
link to a foreign government or foreign terrorist organization. When 
there is no evidence of such a link, FISA provides no authority. In such 
cases, covert search authority—if needed—comes only from § 3103a. 
The need to detect and prevent terrorist attacks may be the most 
compelling justification for covert search authority, and it is one the 
government has repeatedly invoked to defend § 3103a.43 While there are 
cases of domestic terrorism in which covert search authority may be 
needed, it is important to keep in mind that covert search authority 
already exists under FISA in cases involving international terrorism. 
This lessens, but does not eliminate, the need for covert searching under 
§ 3103a. 
2. The DOJ Examples for Why Section 3103a Is Needed 
Are Not Fully Convincing. 
As noted above, the DOJ has claimed that covert search authority 
under § 3103a is a critical law enforcement tool. A close examination of 
the government’s examples in support of this proposition casts some 
doubt on this claim. At the very least, the DOJ’s examples raise 
questions about which types of cases truly necessitate covert search 
authority. 
In the lead-up to the PATRIOT Act reauthorization in 2005, the 
DOJ prepared a white paper justifying its need for delayed notice search 
warrants, and also expounded on the topic in congressional testimony.44 
From the DOJ materials, several themes emerge. The counterterrorism 
examples are troubling; they show covert searching being conducted in 
cases in which the terrorism connection is either very indirect or 
seemingly nonexistent. More commonly, covert searching is used in 
ordinary criminal investigations to protect an existing wiretap. In 
addition, covert searching is sometimes used to seize drugs—and thus 
remove them from the stream of commerce—during an ongoing 
investigation that investigators wish to keep secret. 
 
43. See, e.g., DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 3; Counter-Terrorism 
Legislation and Proposals, supra note 32, at 20 (statement of James 
Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
44. DNSW White Paper, supra note 5. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
The Fatal Flaws of the “Sneak and Peek” Statute and How to Fix It 
135 
The DOJ states that the dilemma of choosing between searching 
and continuing the investigation “is especially acute in terrorism 
investigations, where the slightest indication of government interest can 
lead a loosely connected cell to dissolve, only to re-form at some other 
time and place in pursuit of some other plot.”45 The DOJ asks the 
following: 
Should investigators who receive a tip of an imminent attack 
decline to search the suspected terrorist’s residence for evidence 
of when and where the attack will occur because notice of the 
search would prevent law enforcement agents from learning the 
identities of the remainder of the terrorist’s cell, leaving it free to 
plan future attacks?46 
The DOJ cited two cases to show the value of § 3013a in 
counterterrorism investigations. The first was the case of Alaa Odeh, a 
Staten Island–based deli owner who was operating a hawala business 
transferring money from the United States to Jordan and the West 
Bank.47 Some of the money transferred through this hawala originated 
with a large Canada-based methamphetamine distribution conspiracy.48 
Odeh was charged with conspiracy to defraud and money-laundering—
not with any terrorism offenses.49 He pled guilty and was sentenced to 
thirty-seven months of imprisonment.50 
James Comey testified about this case as follows: 
[I]n United States v. Odeh, a recent narco-terrorism case, a court 
issued a section 213 warrant to search the contents of an envelope 
that had been mailed to the suspect of an investigation. The 
search confirmed that the suspect was operating a hawala money 
exchange used to funnel money to the Middle East, including to 
an individual associated with someone accused of being an 
operative for Islamic Jihad in Israel. The delayed-notice provision 
allowed investigators to conduct the search without fear of 
 
45. Id. at 2. 
46. Id. 
47. See Id. at 4–5; Press Release, DEA, DEA Investigation Leads to U.S. 
Charges Against Staten Island Man in Plot to Launder Drug Money by 
Sending Proceeds to the West Bank and Jordan (Apr. 15, 2003), 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/2003/nyc041503.html. 
48. See DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 4–5; see also Press Release, 
DEA, supra note 47.  
49. See DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 4–5; see also Press Release, 
DEA, supra note 47. 
50. See DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 4–5; see also Press Release, 
DEA, supra note 47. 
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compromising an ongoing wiretap on the suspect and several of 
his confederates.51  
In other words, Odeh is an example of how covert searching during 
drug investigations can sometimes unearth evidence of other criminal 
conduct, such as illegal money-laundering. Odeh is not an example of 
the most compelling justification for covert searching—discovering 
critical information about an existing terrorist cell so as to prevent and 
disrupt plots.  
It is undoubtedly true that covert searching—like other invasive 
investigative tools—helps to unearth other forms of criminal conduct.52 
The fact that this may sometimes be true—and that it may occasionally 
relate at least tangentially to terrorism—is not a particularly 
compelling justification for covert searching.  
Moreover, the claimed link between Odeh and terrorist groups is 
quite indirect. The DOJ claims that Odeh sent some of the money to 
an individual who was “associated with” a third person. That third 
person was “accused” of being an Islamic Jihad operative. There is no 
claim that this third person in fact received any of the money sent by 
Odeh. Also, Odeh was not charged with providing material support to 
terrorism (or even attempting or conspiring to do so)—a charge that 
would have fit had there been evidence of money actually going to a 
terrorist operative.53 
The second “terrorism” example given by the DOJ is even less 
compelling. The DOJ White Paper mentions a Chicago-area 
investigation in 2003, involving a plan to ship unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) components to Pakistan.54 Investigators obtained a delayed 
notice warrant to obtain e-mails (not a physical covert search), allowing 
them to track down all of the UAV components before arresting the 
main suspect. The suspect later pled guilty; the White Paper does not 
indicate what offenses were involved.55 
 
51. Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Proposals, supra note 31, at 158 
(statement of James Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen. of the United States).  
52. A similar example, not in the terrorism context, is mentioned in the 
DNSW White Paper. During a drug investigation, investigators 
conducting a wiretap learned of a counterfeit credit card operation. Using 
a delayed notice search warrant, investigators opened a package of 
counterfeit credit cards and allowed them to notify banks that certain 
accounts had been compromised. The delayed notice search permitted 
police to “prevent possible imminent harm from the credit card 
counterfeiting scheme while maintaining temporary confidentiality of the 
drug investigation.” DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 7. 
53. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012). 
54. DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 5. 
55. Id. 
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According to press reports, the suspect, Mariam Aidroos, was 
charged with making false statements to government officials.56 U.S. 
Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald explained that Aidroos was not charged 
with any terrorism-related offense: “We’ve charged her with lying to 
government officials. We’ve charged her with no more and no less than 
that. To be blunt, we’re not alleging a terrorist connection at all.”57 
Aidroos pled guilty in December 2003 and was sentenced to three years 
of probation.58 According to the Chicago Tribune, “[t]here have been no 
allegations of links to terrorism since Aidroos’ arrest in May 2003.”59 
There is no evidence that the second “terrorism” example given by 
the DOJ had any connection to terrorism whatsoever. Federal 
authorities were alarmed upon learning that someone in the United 
States was working on shipping UAV components to Pakistan. They 
conducted an investigation, which resulted in a prosecution for making 
a false statement. Had there been evidence that the suspect was 
connected to or attempting to aid any terrorist organizations, the DOJ 
surely would not have been satisfied with a relatively minor charge and 
a sentence of probation. 
Neither of these real-world “counterterrorism” examples bears any 
resemblance to the hypothetical scenario proffered by the DOJ: the 
need to conduct a covert search to ward off an imminent attack without 
tipping off a clandestine terror cell.60 Perhaps the DOJ had better 
examples but could not disclose them publicly. Or perhaps these 
scenarios simply do not arise very often—and when they do, FISA is 
sometimes used rather than § 3103a. The DOJ’s statistics show that 
§ 3103a is used in counterterrorism investigations only about a dozen 
times per year, whereas they are used thousands of times per year in 
drug investigations.61  
Apart from the scarce information related to terrorism cases, the 
DOJ provided a number of examples of how covert searching has proven 
useful in drug investigations. The primary benefit covert searching 
provides in drug cases is to allow investigators to discover and seize 
drugs—thus preventing them from entering the market—while 
continuing the investigation.  
This is a government interest that seems compelling in some cases 
and less compelling in others. The amount, value, and danger of the 
drugs involved is one crucial variable—a variable the statute does not 
 
56. Matt O’Connor & Rick Jervis, U.S. Says Woman Lied About Parts for 
Drones, Chi. Trib., May 30, 2003, at W1. 
57. Id. 
58. Three Years’ Probation for Lying to U.S., Chi. Trib., May 4, 2004, at 
C2. 
59. Id. 
60. DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 2. 
61. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 535, Figure 2. 
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take into account. This is addressed below, in Part V. The privacy cost 
of one covert search may be worth the benefit of preventing 100 
kilograms of cocaine from hitting the streets; it would seem much less 
justified if the prize were preventing 50 grams of marijuana from being 
smoked at a frat party. 
The White Paper again begins with a compelling case that appears 
to be hypothetical: 
Consider, for example, a case in which law enforcement received 
a tip that a large shipment of heroin was about to be distributed 
and obtained a warrant to seize the drugs. To preserve the 
investigation’s confidentiality and yet prevent the drug’s 
distribution, investigators would prefer to make the seizure 
appear to be a theft by rival drug traffickers. Should investigators 
be forced to let the drugs hit the streets because notice of a seizure 
would disclose the investigation and destroy any chance of 
identifying the drug ring’s leaders and dismantling the 
operation—or to make the alternative choice to sacrifice the 
investigation to keep dangerous drugs out of the community?62 
Turning to real-world examples, the White Paper refers to “Operation 
Candy Box,” an investigation into a Canada-based ecstasy and 
marijuana trafficking organization.63 In March 2004, investigators 
followed a car they had learned was carrying a large quantity of 
ecstasy.64 Police obtained a delayed notice warrant for the car, and after 
it stopped at a restaurant, police entered the car and drove it away 
“while other agents spread broken glass in the parking space to create 
the impression that the vehicle had been stolen.”65  
Police seized 30,000 ecstasy tablets and ten pounds of marijuana 
from a hidden compartment in the vehicle. A few weeks later, more 
than 130 persons were arrested. Without the covert search, agents 
would have had to choose to either prematurely expose the 
investigation, or permit the 30,000 pills of ecstasy to continue on their 
path to distribution.66 
A second example came from 2002 when, as part of a multistate 
methamphetamine investigation, the DEA learned that suspects were 
planning to distribute a large quantity of methamphetamine in 
Indianapolis.67 With a delayed notice search warrant, DEA agents 
searched the stash location and seized 8.5 pounds of methamphetamine  
62. DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
63. Id. at 5. 
64. Id.  
65. Id.  
66. Id.  
67. Id. at 6. 
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without notifying the suspects. As a result of this seizure, “two main 
suspects had a telephone conversation about the disappearance that 
provided investigators further leads, eventually resulting in the seizure 
of fifteen more pounds of methamphetamine and the identification of 
other members of the criminal organization.”68  
Here, two key benefits flowed from the covert search. First, 
investigators seized 8.5 pounds of methamphetamine—potentially 
providing approximately 15,000 individual hits, worth approximately 
$85,000–$130,000. Second, the covert seizure prompted participants in 
the conspiracy to discuss what happened—providing further leads, the 
seizure of additional drugs, and the identification of other individuals.69  
This second benefit is worth contemplating. On the one hand, the 
value to the investigation was considerable—the seizure of a substantial 
amount of additional methamphetamine, as well as the identification of 
additional suspects. On the other hand, this type of “benefit” carries 
with it some grave risks, such as retaliation and violence to third 
parties. A covert seizure may well prompt criminal conspirators to 
discuss what happened, who might have been involved, and what to do 
about it. That can lead to valuable evidence about the conspiracy. It 
might also lead to retaliatory violence against third parties, including 
cases in which the conspirators do not discuss their plans over 
wiretapped phone lines and thus are not detected by investigators. This 
danger is discussed further in Part V below. 
It is not clear that these isolated examples—selected by the DOJ—
are representative of all covert searches conducted under § 3103a. These 
examples do suggest, however, that § 3103a is not terribly important 
for counterterrorism purposes—a context in which investigators have 
more powerful tools under FISA anyway. Instead, § 3103a is used to 
allow police to conduct covert searches while protecting wiretaps during 
ongoing investigations and to enable police to seize drugs and cash 
during ongoing drug investigations. The value of those goals—and the 
dangers posed by them—are discussed further in Part V.  
II. Regulating Departures from Fourth 
Amendment Baselines  
To understand the problem with the sneak and peek statute, as 
well as the logical fix for that problem, it is important to understand 
the concepts of exigent circumstances and necessity. Exigent  
68. Id. The White Paper also gives a third example in which “more than 225 
kilograms of drugs”—type not specified—were seized with a delayed 
notice search warrant. Id. Few details are given for this example.  
69. A similar pattern occurred with the seizure of the 225 kilograms of drugs. 
The covert seizure in that case was followed by interceptions of discussions 
showing “that the suspects believed that other drug dealers had stolen 
their drugs,” and communications on the wiretapped lines continued. Id.  
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circumstances and necessity might best be understood as two facets of 
a more basic underlying principle—the need for special circumstances 
to justify deviating from traditional Fourth Amendment rules.  
A. Necessity and Exigency: Facets of Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness 
The doctrine of “exigent circumstances” justifies a warrantless 
government entry into a home.70 The failure to obtain a warrant is 
excused due to the presence of an exigency. The common list of exigent 
circumstances consists of (1) the need to render emergency aid or 
protect someone from imminent injury, (2) the need to prevent the 
imminent destruction of evidence, and (3) the hot pursuit of a fleeing 
suspect.71  
The concept of “necessity,” in contrast, involves the notion that 
ordinary search techniques are inadequate—a lack of other reasonable 
alternatives.72 For example, to obtain a wiretap order under Title III, 
police must show “that ‘normal investigative procedures’ have either 
failed or appear unlikely to succeed.”73 This requirement was “designed 
to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where 
traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.”74 
Title III itself does not use the term “necessity,” but lower courts and 
commentators commonly refer to this rule as the “necessity” 
requirement for wiretapping.75 
 
70. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011). 
71. Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Michigan v. 
Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 
42–43 (1976); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 (2006); Minnesota 
v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 (1990)). 
72. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of 
Reasonableness, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 977, 1037 (“‘Necessity’ means that 
it must be shown that utilizing the preferred model of reasonableness will 
not protect the governmental interest.”); Paul Ohm, Probably Probable 
Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justificatory Standards, 94 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1514, 1554 (2010) (noting that a “necessity” requirement means 
that “given the especially invasive nature of a wiretap, the police must 
turn to it only as a last resort”). 
73. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2518(1)(c), 2518(3)(c)(2012). Section 2518(1)(c) requires “a full and 
complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures 
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely 
to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)(2012).  
74. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 101 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112). See James G. Carr & Patricia L. Bellia, The 
Law of Electronic Surveillance § 4.39 (2011). 
75. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Rice, 478 F.3d 704, 709 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Carter, 
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At times, it has appeared that the concept of “necessity” was part 
of—embedded in—the doctrine of exigent circumstances. Decisions 
articulating the “exigent circumstances” doctrine have sometimes used 
the language of “necessity” as synonymous with, or to help define, the 
concept of exigency. In McDonald v. United States,76 Justice Jackson 
stated that “[w]hether there is reasonable necessity for a search without 
waiting to obtain a warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the 
gravity of the offense.”77 The Sixth Circuit has stated that “[i]n 
reviewing whether exigent circumstances were present, we consider the 
‘totality of the circumstances and the inherent necessities of the 
situation at the time.’”78 The First Circuit has similarly stated that 
“[e]xigent circumstances exist where ‘there is such a compelling 
necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay of obtaining 
a warrant.’”79 
 
449 F.3d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 
638, 644 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204, 1206–
07 (9th Cir. 2001); People v. Acevedo, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 474 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012); People v. Rabb, 945 N.E.2d 447, 458 (N.Y. 2011) 
(Lippman, J., dissenting); State v. Finesmith, 974 A.2d 438, 442 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009); State v. Oster, 922 A.2d 151, 155 (R.I. 2007); 
Commonwealth v. Westerman, 611 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Mass. 1993); 
Shaktman v. State, 529 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); State 
v. Hale, 641 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Ariz. 1982). See also Carr & Bellia, supra 
note 74, at § 4.39 (noting that the section 2518(1)(c) standard “may be 
roughly denominated as the necessity or exhaustion requirement”); Paul 
Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 Miss. L.J 
1309, 1349–50 (2012); Jacqueline E. Ross, Valuing Inside Knowledge: 
Police Infiltration as a Problem for the Law of Evidence, 79 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 1111, 1149 n.17 (2004).  
76.  McDonald v. Unites States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
77. Id. at 459 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
78. Ziegler v. Aukerman, 512 F.3d 777, 785 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1511 (6th Cir. 1996)) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted [sic]). See also United States v. Phillips, 931 F. 
Supp. 2d 783, 793 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“As in Beasley, a number of police 
officers were at Defendant’s residence, and the police could simply have 
secured the area by posting officers at the entrances to the house. Because 
there was no necessity to search the house, the officers’ warrantless search 
cannot be justified on the basis of exigent circumstances.”).  
79. Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 49 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting 
United States v. Almonte, 952 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Tibbles, 169 Wash.2d 364, 
372–73, 236 P.3d 885 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (quoting State v. Patterson, 
774 P.2d 10, 12 (Wash. 1989)) (The Washington Supreme Court has 
explained, “[t]he underlying theme of the exigent circumstances exception 
remains ‘[n]ecessity, a societal need to search without a warrant.’”). 
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In Berger v. New York,80 the Court contrasted the flawed New York 
wiretapping statute with a warrant for the installation of a covert 
listening device that the Court had approved a year earlier in Osborn 
v. United States.81 The Osborn warrant, the Court explained, was 
constitutional in part because it permitted “no greater invasion of 
privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances.”82 
Commentators have relied on this language to suggest a “necessity” or 
“least intrusive means” component of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness.83 
Today, it is clear that there is a distinction between the concept of 
“exigent circumstances” and that of “necessity” (at least “necessity” in 
the sense of “last resort” or “least intrusive means”) and that the former 
does not include the latter. The case that drove a clear wedge between 
these concepts was Kentucky v. King.84 In King, the Court held that 
exigent circumstances could justify a warrantless search even if police 
could have conducted the same search—and found the same evidence—
with a warrant. The Court noted that “[s]ome courts . . . fault law 
enforcement officers if, after acquiring evidence that is sufficient to 
establish probable cause to search particular premises, the officers do 
not seek a warrant but instead knock on the door and seek either to 
speak with an occupant or to obtain consent to search.”85 These courts 
were, in effect, imposing a necessity requirement as a part of the exigent 
circumstances test: a warrantless search was permissible, with exigent 
circumstances, only if ordinary search techniques (using a warrant) 
were not reasonably available. The Supreme Court rejected this 
approach, stating that it “unjustifiably interferes with legitimate law 
enforcement strategies” and that “[t]here are many entirely proper 
reasons why police may not want to seek a search warrant as soon as 
the bare minimum of evidence needed to establish probable cause is 
acquired.”86 
Instead, the Court held that if exigent circumstances are present, 
police may conduct a warrantless search even if they could have 
 
80.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
81. Id. at 56 (1967) (analyzing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966)). 
82. Id. at 59. See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1967) 
(quoting this language with approval). 
83. See, e.g., Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting 
the Law of Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 
31, 133 (1983); Daniel F. Cook, Note, Electronic Surveillance, Title III, 
and the Requirement of Necessity, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 571, 579 
(1975). 
84. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
85. Id. at 1860. 
86. Id. 
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structured their investigation to obtain the same result by using a 
warrant.87 Stated differently, the Court rejected the concept of necessity 
in the context of warrantless searches due to exigent circumstances. 
Under King, police making use of exigent circumstances do not have to 
show that they could not have achieved the same result using a warrant.  
Justice Ginsburg dissented for precisely this reason, arguing that 
exigent circumstances were present only when police had no reasonable 
alternatives for conducting a search with a warrant. Justice Ginsburg 
argued that the exigent circumstances “exception should govern only in 
genuine emergency situations.”88 If police “could pause to gain the 
approval of a neutral magistrate,” then they should not be permitted 
to “dispense with the need to get a warrant by themselves creating 
exigent circumstances.”89 
Of course, the doctrine of exigent circumstances is not the only 
Fourth Amendment rule that regulates when police can deviate from 
ordinary constitutional requirements. At a higher level of generality, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the Fourth Amendment 
as establishing certain baseline requirements, or default rules, for 
conducting searches. To deviate from those baselines, police must show 
some kind of special circumstances justifying the deviation. The 
fundamental question, under the Court’s current interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment, is whether the search is “reasonable.”90  
This basic framework—baseline rules with exceptions permitted in 
specified circumstances—occurs in various Fourth Amendment 
contexts. The most fundamental baseline is the warrant. “It is a ‘basic 
principle of Fourth Amendment law,’” the Court has repeatedly said, 
“‘that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable.’”91 Police can deviate nevertheless from 
that baseline—search a home without a warrant—in special 
circumstances. And as noted above, one clearly established set of 
circumstances that justify deviating from the warrant baseline is the 
doctrine of “exigent circumstances.”92 
Another Fourth Amendment default rule is giving notice of the 
search. Before breaking into a home to execute a search warrant, police 
ordinarily must announce their presence and authority to search—
sometimes called the “knock and announce” rule.93 A search without  
87. Id. at 1862. 
88. Id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
89. Id. 
90. See id. at 1856 (majority opinion); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 
403 (2006). 
91. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (quoting Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403). 
92. Id. 
93. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
The Fatal Flaws of the “Sneak and Peek” Statute and How to Fix It 
144 
notice is presumptively unreasonable.94 But police can deviate from this 
baseline in special circumstances. Police can conduct a “no-knock 
search” when knocking and announcing would create a threat of 
physical violence or when it would risk the destruction of evidence.95 
Those circumstances should sound familiar: they are similar to two of 
the types of “exigent circumstances” justifying warrantless entry.  
There is at least one other reason police can dispense with “knock 
and announce”—cases of “futility.”96 The “futility” exception is 
different from traditional “exigent circumstances” in the context of 
warrantless entry. “Futility” is the notion that police know it would be 
pointless to knock and announce, because the suspects inside are 
already aware of the police presence and are unwilling to open the 
door.97 The “futility” exception to knock-and-announce has no real 
analogue in the context of warrantless searches. 
Thus, there is some similarity between the “special circumstances” 
justifying warrantless search and those justifying a no-knock entry, but 
there are also differences. Returning to the higher level of generality, 
the core Fourth Amendment requirement (as interpreted by the Court) 
is reasonableness. Applying that reasonableness mandate in two 
different contexts—warrantless searches versus no-knock searches—the 
Court has tailored the exceptions to fit the particular factual context 
involved.  
A covert search, conducted with a delayed notice search warrant, 
is another deviation from a Fourth Amendment baseline. Like a no-
knock search, a covert search bypasses the ordinary notice 
requirement—except that for a no-knock search, notice is delayed by a 
minute or so, whereas with a covert search with a delayed notice search 
warrant, notice is delayed for weeks or months. 
The key question, then, is determining whether there is a 
constitutional standard that might justify a covert search—a long-term 
deviation from the notice baseline. Part II.B turns to the analogous 
 
94. Id. at 931–37; King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (quoting Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403 
(quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004))). 
95. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 390 (1997) (citing Wilson, 514 U.S. 
at 936). See also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 589–90 (2006). 
96. Richards, 520 U.S. at 3944; Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589–90 (2006).  
97. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589–90 (2006). See, e.g., United States v. Dunnock, 
295 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that no-knock entry permitted 
on grounds of futility: “Dunnock, having been arrested and questioned by 
the police outside his home, clearly had notice of the authority and 
purpose of the officers executing the search warrant”); United States v. 
Tracy, 835 F.2d 1267, 1270 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Under these circumstances, 
we agree the officers could have justifiably believed defendants were 
anticipating their arrival and knew their purpose. Thus, announcing their 
purpose would have been a useless gesture.”). 
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context of wiretapping (itself a form of covert searching) to consider 
what the right constitutional standard might be. 
B. Deviating from the “Rule Requiring Notice”: 
Regulating Covert Wiretapping 
The Supreme Court has never articulated a Fourth Amendment 
standard governing covert searches. The Court has made clear that a 
covert entry, incident to installing a court-authorized wiretap or 
listening device, can be constitutionally permissible.98 But the Court 
has never directly addressed the permissibility of a covert search or 
covert seizure conducted for its own sake (as opposed to incident to a 
wiretap). 
One type of search that involves a lack of contemporaneous notice 
is wiretapping. A wiretap consists of an ongoing search of private 
conversations as they occur, without contemporaneous notice to the 
parties. The covert nature of the search is a logical necessity for 
wiretapping to have any effectiveness—persons would not make 
incriminating statements if they knew investigators were listening.99  
This section explains the “necessity” standard in the context of 
wiretapping and argues that this standard—which the Supreme Court 
has never stated is a Fourth Amendment requirement—is nonetheless 
constitutional in origin. It also explains why the drafters of Title III 
chose to regulate covert wiretapping with the concept of necessity 
rather than exigent circumstances.  
The Title III “necessity” standard actually arose directly in 
connection with the concept of “exigent circumstances.” Courts and 
commentators have long recognized that Congress sought to craft a 
wiretapping law that remedied a number of constitutional defects the 
Supreme Court had identified in Berger v. New York and other cases.100 
 
98. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 247–48 (1979) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit per se a covert entry performed for the 
purpose of installing otherwise legal electronic bugging equipment.”). 
99. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355–56 n.16 (1967) (“A 
conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended 
search. But if Osborn had been told in advance that federal officers 
intended to record his conversations, the point of making such recordings 
would obviously have been lost; the evidence in question could not have 
been obtained.”). 
100. Cook, supra note 83, at 577–86 (1975) (explaining the origins of the Title 
III “necessity” requirement and arguing that it has a constitutional 
foundation); Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping Reform: The Legality of 
Roving Surveillance, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 401, 403 (1987) (“Title III 
culminated a constitutional debate transcending four decades of 
jurisprudence.”); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 884 (7th Cir. 
1984) (Posner, J.) (“Title III was Congress’s carefully thought out, and 
constitutionally valid . . . effort to implement the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment with regard to the necessarily unconventional type of 
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In Berger v. New York, one of the many criticisms the Court leveled 
at New York’s wiretapping statute was the lack of notice of the search: 
[The statute has] no requirement for notice as do conventional 
warrants, nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some 
showing of special facts. On the contrary, it permits uncontested 
entry without any showing of exigent circumstances. Such a 
showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice would appear more 
important in eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that 
required when conventional procedures of search and seizure are 
utilized.101  
In drafting Title III, Congress “prepared a checklist of Berger and Katz 
requirements” in an effort to draft legislation that was constitutionally 
sound.102 Item eight on the checklist was “[a] showing of exigent 
circumstances in order to overcome the defect of not giving prior 
notice.”103 Congress recognized that the lack of notice inherent in 
wiretapping gave rise to constitutional concerns and that the standard 
mechanism for bypassing the notice requirement was the doctrine of 
exigent circumstances.  
Notably, Congress did not create an “exigent circumstances” 
requirement for obtaining a Title III wiretap, as had been suggested by 
the Berger opinion. It did, however, require “some showing of special 
facts” justifying this intrusive search. Rather than requiring a showing 
of “exigency,” Congress required police to show necessity—that 
ordinary investigative techniques had been exhausted or could not 
reasonably be used to accomplish the stated goals—even though such a 
requirement is not one of the eight listed by the Senate Report as 
distilled from Berger.104  
Professor Ric Simmons has argued that the “necessity” requirement 
of Title III has “no basis in the Fourth Amendment” but is merely a 
statutory creation by Congress.105 He notes that “Berger does not 
mention a ‘least intrusive means’ requirement” and that the “exigent 
circumstances” requirement “is not identical to the statutory  
warrant that is used to authorize electronic eavesdropping.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
101. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967). 
102. Goldsmith, supra note 83, at 38.  
103. Id. at 39 (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, at 2161–62). 
104. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012). 
105. Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us from Big Brother? The Need for 
Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 547, 565, 567 (2003) (Simmons refers to the “necessity” 
requirement as the “least intrusive means” requirement; both terms refer 
to section 2518(1)(c)). 
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requirement that ‘normal investigative procedures have been tried and 
have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to 
be too dangerous.’”106 Other commentators, as well as some courts, have 
nonetheless argued that the Title III “necessity” requirement is 
constitutional in origin and was drafted to remedy the lack of notice 
inherent in a wiretap.107 
The Senate Report on the bill does not explain why the drafters of 
Title III chose to include the “necessity” standard and chose not to use 
the traditional language of “exigent circumstances.”108 Professor Robert 
Blakely, a leading drafter of Title III, linked the necessity requirement 
and the exigent circumstances doctrine in his congressional testimony 
about the bill:  
[S]uch a showing of “special facts” or “exigent circumstances” 
would unquestionably be met by a legislative requirement that 
judicial authorization for the use of electronic surveillance 
techniques be conditioned on a showing that “normal 
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried.”109 
 
106. Id. at 565. 
107. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 83, at 126 (The necessity requirement 
“stems from two distinct constitutional principles underlying Title III: (1) 
prior notice of fourth amendment intrusions, and (2) utilization of the 
least drastic means. . . . In effect, a showing of necessity thereby became 
a constitutional substitute for prior notice.”); Cook, supra note 83 at 577–
78; David P. Hodges, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth 
Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 261, 
288–89 (1976); Carr & Bellia, supra note 74, at § 2:53 (“To establish 
the showing of exigent circumstances required by the Supreme Court in 
Berger, § 2518(1)(c) provides that the application must include ‘a full and 
complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures 
have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely 
to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.’”). United States v. Salemme, 
91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 364 (D. Mass. 1999) (explaining in detail why “the 
necessity provision of Title III, § 2518(1)(c), is constitutional in origin”), 
rev’d on alternative grounds, United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st 
Cir. 2000). 
108. S. Rep. No. 1097, at 66, (1968) reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112-14. 
109. Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 935 (1967). Professor Blakely also noted that 
this standard was part of England’s wiretapping requirements. Id. at 977 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012)). See also Carr & Bellia, supra 
note 74, at § 2:53 (“To establish the showing of exigent circumstances 
required by the Supreme Court in Berger, § 2518(1)(c) provides that the 
application must include ‘a full and complete statement as to whether or 
not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they 
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In essence, Professor Blakely claimed that the necessity standard was a 
manifestation of the “exigent circumstances” requirement. Even so, 
Professor Simmons is right that, at least today, the doctrines of 
“necessity” and “exigent circumstances” are not the same. Neither 
Professor Blakely nor later commentators explain why the drafters 
chose the “necessity” rule in place of the more traditional “exigent 
circumstances” rules.110 
Thus, the use of necessity rather than “exigent circumstances” 
remains something of a puzzle. As one district court acknowledged, 
“there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment, or in traditional search 
and seizure law, which requires that law enforcement personnel exhaust 
or otherwise attempt other investigative procedures before resorting to 
an application for a conventional search warrant.”111  
The key to this puzzle is not doctrinal but practical. The drafters 
of Title III appear to have done for wiretapping just what the Supreme 
Court has done in other contexts—attempt to discern the particular 
type of “special circumstances” that make sense to justify the particular 
type of departure in question. In the context of no-knock searches, for 
example, the Supreme Court did not reflexively graft the “exigent 
circumstances” rules for warrantless searches onto the context of no-
knock searches. Instead, the Court considered the particular nature of 
no-knock searches to determine when departures from the  
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too 
dangerous.’”) 
110. Daniel Cook provides a comprehensive argument that the “necessity” 
standard does have a constitutional basis, in particular that it was 
intended and understood to fulfill the Fourth Amendment problem 
created by lack of notice. Cook, supra note 80, at 577–86. Cook also 
suggests that the “exigent circumstances” doctrine is a poor fit in the 
context of wiretapping. Id. at 579–84. Cook argues that “[t]hough the 
meaning of exigent circumstances as used in the Berger opinion has not 
been made clear, the most persuasive explanation is that it is a reference 
to what subsequently was codified in Title III as the necessity 
requirement.” Id. at 579. This overstates matters. There is no reason to 
believe that the Berger Court was actually contemplating or invoking the 
concept of “necessity” when it mentioned the need for some exigency to 
justify the lack of notice. The Court was simply explaining one flaw in 
the New York wiretapping statute. It is not the case that the drafters of 
Title III somehow “discovered” that the Court in Berger really meant 
“necessity” when it said “exigency.” Instead, the drafters of Title III 
articulated a standard that responded to the constitutional concerns 
identified in Berger. There is no reason to insist that constitutional 
standards must emerge first from the Court rather than the legislature. 
This is not to say that Congress defines what is constitutional, but rather 
that what is eventually recognized as a constitutional rule or standard 
may have been articulated by the legislature before it is recognized by the 
Court.  
111. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 365, rev’d on alternative grounds; Flemmi, 
225 F.3d 78. 
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constitutional baseline were justified—or, using the language of the 
Fourth Amendment, were reasonable. 
The drafters of Title III did the same. They seem to have recognized 
that in the context of wiretapping, it was important to craft “special 
circumstances” that made sense in light of the particular character of 
that type of search. They did not directly apply the “exigent 
circumstances” rules for warrantless searching because a direct 
application of that doctrine does not make sense in the different context 
of covert wiretapping.112 
To excuse the lack of notice of the wiretap, why not require police 
to show that notice would create a danger to the officers or others, or 
would risk the destruction of evidence, or the escape of a suspect? The 
problem with this standard is that it would always be satisfied for any 
requested wiretap.  
The evidence sought in a wiretap is the conversations themselves. 
Giving notice to the speakers would always risk the destruction of this 
evidence in the sense that the speakers would make no incriminating 
statements if they knew the search was being conducted.  
In addition to losing the conversations, giving notice of a wiretap 
also inherently creates risks that the suspects will destroy (or conceal) 
other evidence, or that suspects will escape, or perhaps that third 
parties will be put in danger. The purpose of a wiretap is to covertly 
gather incriminating statements at a time when the investigation is 
ongoing—when contraband has not yet been seized and suspects have 
not yet been arrested. Notice of the wiretap would ordinarily put an 
end to the investigation—to require police to seize any desired 
contraband and arrest any suspects before the wiretap is put into place. 
This explains why the drafters of Title III did not use the traditional 
“exigent circumstances” rules. That doctrine simply fails, as a logical 
and practical matter, to effectively regulate the practice of wiretapping. 
The rules regulating warrantless entry do not “fit” the factual context 
of covert wiretapping. 
Instead, the drafters of Title III sought to articulate the type of 
“special circumstances” that would fit the practice of covert 
wiretapping—that would justify a departure from the Fourth 
Amendment baseline of providing notice of a search. They chose 
necessity, or the requirement of last resort. To make use of the 
unusually invasive technique of covertly listening to telephone 
 
112. Of course, at the time Title III was drafted in the 1960s, the Court had 
not yet ruled that the knock-and-announce principle was a component of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness—the Court first did so in Wilson v. 
Arkansas, in 1995. Even so, the common law knock-and-announce rule 
was well established long before 1995, and many of the exceptions that 
permitted no-knock entry are also ancient in origin. See Wilson v. 
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929–32 (citing cases); Witmer-Rich, supra note 
3, at 572–76.  
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conversations, police must show that ordinary investigative techniques 
would not suffice.113 
This analysis highlights a few key points that bear on the 
appropriate standard for covert searching with delayed notice search 
warrants. First, it is now clear, after Kentucky v. King, that the 
concepts of “exigent circumstances” and “necessity” are doctrinally 
distinct. A showing of “necessity” is not part of an “exigent 
circumstances” analysis—at least in the context of warrantless 
searching.  
Second, the Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as 
setting certain “baseline” or “default” search rules, such as using a 
warrant and giving notice of a search. At the same time, the Court 
permits deviations from those baseline rules under “special 
circumstances.” The fundamental test is one of “reasonableness.” 
Third, the Court uses different standards for judging “special 
circumstances” depending on the baseline in question and the type of 
departure sought. The Court tailors the “special circumstances” that 
might permit the departure in question by considering the purpose of 
the baseline rule and by evaluating what mechanisms might 
appropriately regulate and justify departures from that baseline. 
With this conceptual groundwork in place, we can now turn to the 
question of whether covert searches of physical spaces can be 
constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
III. The Flaw in the Sneak and Peek Statute 
The statutory grounds for conducting a covert, delayed notice 
search largely mirror the Fourth Amendment “exigent circumstances” 
doctrine. Part III.A sets forth the current standards, under § 3103a, for 
delayed notice searches, and compares them to the “exigent 
circumstances” doctrine. Part III.B explains the core problem with this 
model: the “exigent circumstances” doctrine is a fundamentally 
ineffective way to regulate covert searching. 
A. Current Regulation of Delayed Notice Search Warrants 
Delayed notice search warrants did not originate with the USA 
PATRIOT Act. At least as early as 1985, some courts issued search 
warrants expressly authorizing a covert entry of a physical space for 
 
113. “This showing of necessity reflects the Fourth Amendment requirement 
that searches and seizures be ‘reasonable’ and addresses the related 
statements in Berger . . . and Katz . . . that courts should authorize ‘no 
greater invasion of privacy . . . than [is] necessary under the 
circumstances.’” United States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266, 1288 (Mass. 
1991) (citations omitted). 
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purpose of searching.114 There were only a few judicial decisions 
analyzing the legality of this practice.115 The Ninth Circuit held that 
covert searches implicated the Fourth Amendment but that they were 
permissible so long as notice was provided within seven days and so 
long as investigators showed “necessity” for the search.116 The Second 
Circuit took a more permissive approach, questioning whether “notice” 
had any basis in the Fourth Amendment and stating that investigators 
need only show “there is a good reason for the delay.”117 
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the DOJ sought—and was 
granted—express statutory authority to conduct “sneak and peek” 
searches through section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act, codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3103a.118 The DOJ has argued that under the current statute, 
“delayed-notice warrants can be used . . . only in extremely narrow 
circumstances.”119 This is not true. As explained below, the current 
statute authorized delayed notice searches in almost any case in which 
law enforcement wishes to conduct one. 
In drafting the delayed notice search warrant statute, Congress 
looked to another statute—the Stored Communications Act—to come 
up with the list of justifications for a covert search. Instead of drafting 
new language unique to delayed notice search warrants, Congress 
provided that contemporaneous notice can be delayed when the 
government shows that notice would cause an “adverse result,” as 
defined in § 2705 of the Stored Communications Act.120 The warrant 
must require notice within thirty days of execution, although that time 
 
114. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 519–31 (giving a history of the legal 
development of sneak and peek searches). See also United States v. 
Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) (first reported judicial opinion 
discussing delayed notice search warrants). The idea of a “sneak and peek” 
warrant showed up in popular culture before passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act in October 2001. In an episode of The Sopranos that first 
aired March 4, 2001, federal investigators request—and are granted—
what the magistrate judge refers to as a “sneak and peek” warrant to 
install a bug, disguised as a lamp, in Tony Soprano’s basement. The 
Sopranos: Mr. Ruggerio’s Neighborhood (HBO television broadcast Mar. 
4, 2001).  
115. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 519–25 (discussing cases). 
116. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456. 
117. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993). 
118. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3 at 525–31 (detailing the debate over, and 
passage of, section 213, denoted as section 352 in earlier versions of the 
proposed legislation). 
119. DNSW White Paper, supra note 5, at 4.  
120. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012). 
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is subject to extension.121 In practice, over half of all delayed notice 
warrants involve delays of ninety days or more.122 
An “adverse result,” for purposes of obtaining a delayed notice 
search warrant, consists of any of the following:  
(A) endangering the life or physical safety of an individual;  
(B) flight from prosecution;  
(C) destruction of or tampering with evidence;  
(D) intimidation of potential witnesses; or  
(E) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation.123 
The first four items on this list—subsections (A)–D)—closely 
resemble the Fourth Amendment categories of “exigent circumstances.” 
Subsection (A), preventing danger to the “life or physical safety of any 
individual,” is substantively the same as the “emergency aid” type of 
“exigent circumstance.” “Under the ‘emergency aid’ exception, . . . 
‘officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency 
assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from 
imminent injury.’”124 This exception includes circumstances in which 
obtaining a warrant would create a danger of physical harm to the 
police themselves, not only to third parties.125  
Subsection (B), “flight from prosecution,” is equivalent to the next 
exception, which allows warrantless searches when in hot pursuit or 
otherwise to prevent the escape of a suspect.126 This type of “exigent 
circumstance” has more broadly been described as including any action 
 
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3) (2012). 
122. Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 537–38 & Table 1. 
123. Section 2705(a)(2)(E) also includes “unduly delaying a trial” as a reason 
to delay notice under the Stored Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2705(a)(2)(E) (2012). In section 3013a(b)(3), providing for delayed 
notice search warrants, Congress specifically rejected “unduly delaying a 
trial” as a reason for giving delayed notice of a conventional warrant. 18 
U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3) (2012). 
124. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).  
125. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 101 (1990) (noting that an exception 
may arise when there is “risk of danger to the police or to other persons 
inside or outside the dwelling”) (internal quotations omitted).  
126. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 
42–43 (1976)). 
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required to prevent the escape of a suspect (not merely when in hot 
pursuit).127  
Subsection (C), “destruction of or tampering with evidence,” 
mirrors the third type of exigent circumstance: the need “‘to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence,’” which “has long been 
recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search.”128  
The fourth statutory exception, “intimidation of potential 
witnesses,” is not found in the traditional list of “exigent 
circumstances.” Broadly speaking, however, this exception is similar to 
concerns over the destruction of evidence. In both cases,  
the concern is ensuring that the Fourth Amendment does not enable 
the suspects to obstruct justice or subvert the proper purposes of the 
search. Subsection (D), then, seems a logical application of the 
“destruction of evidence” exception to the context of delayed notice 
search warrants. 
Subsection (E) authorizes a covert search when notice would 
“otherwise seriously jeopardiz[e] an investigation.”129 This catch-all 
exception clearly goes beyond the traditional doctrine of “exigent 
circumstances.” Indeed, critics of § 3103a have often focused on this 
subsection (E) “catch-all” provision, and legislators have attempted to 
remove subsection (E) from § 3103a. As explained below in Part IV.C, 
this focus on subsection (E) is misplaced. The true problem with 
§ 3103a lies in subsections (A)–(D). 
B. The Fatal Flaw: How “Exigent Circumstances” 
Functions in Covert Searches 
A more careful consideration of how delayed notice search warrants 
operate shows why the doctrine of exigent circumstances, or the related 
exceptions permitting no-knock searches, do not adequately limit the 
practice of delayed notice search warrants.  
Many criminal investigations force law enforcement officers to 
balance two competing concerns: (1) the need to gather evidence, and 
 
127. See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Circumstances 
qualify as ‘exigent’ when there is an imminent risk of death or serious 
injury, or danger that evidence will be immediately destroyed, or that a 
suspect will escape.”) (citing Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403). 
128. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856–57 (citing Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403; Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 n.6 (2006); Olson, 495 U.S. at 100).  
129. Section 2705(a)(2)(E) also includes “unduly delaying a trial” as a reason 
to delay notice under the Stored Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2705(a)(2)(E) (2012). In section 3103a, providing for delayed notice 
search warrants, Congress specifically rejected “unduly delaying a trial” 
as a reason for giving delayed notice of a conventional warrant. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3103a(b)(1) (2012). 
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(2) the need to continue the investigation.130 These two goals are not 
always in tension, but often they are. The easiest and most effective 
ways to gather evidence often involve (or at least risk) tipping off 
suspects to the existence of the investigation. And when suspects 
become aware that police are on to them, they often seek to escape, 
destroy or conceal evidence, or otherwise frustrate any future 
investigation. 
Covert searching offers a way for investigators to have their cake 
and eat it too—discovering evidence while keeping the investigation 
secret and thus ongoing. As the DOJ White Paper states: 
investigators and prosecutors on the front lines of fighting crime 
and terrorism should not be forced to choose between preventing 
immediate harm—such as a terrorist attack or an influx of 
drugs—and completing a sensitive investigation that might shut 
down the entire terror cell or drug trafficking operation. Thanks 
to . . . delayed-notice warrants . . . they do not have to make that 
choice.131  
The problem with the current statute is that it offers police this option 
in almost every case, not merely when police have some extraordinary 
need.  
Consider an ordinary drug investigation. Assume police have 
developed probable cause to believe that drugs are being manufactured 
or stored in a given location. With traditional “notice” searching, police 
have two basic options. First, they could obtain and execute a search 
warrant now, seizing any evidence and arresting any suspects who are 
present, but losing most of their opportunity to develop more evidence 
or identify more suspects. Second, they could elect to continue the 
investigation, hoping to develop additional evidence and identify new 
suspects, all the while taking the risk that the evidence will disappear 
and the suspects will escape. Covert searching offers a third option: 
execute a covert search and seizure today, keeping the investigation 
secret and ongoing. 
When should this third option be available? Under § 3103a, police 
have this third option whenever they can show that giving notice of the 
search would create exigent circumstances—destruction of evidence, 
danger to the police or others, or escape of a suspect—or otherwise 
seriously jeopardize the investigation. In practice, this means that the 
police can obtain a delayed notice search warrant whenever they wish 
to do so.  
 
130. The DOJ white paper explains that providing notice in every case creates 
a “quandary in certain sensitive investigations: how to accommodate both 
the urgent need to conduct a search and the equally pressing need to keep 
the ongoing investigation confidential.” DNSW White Paper, supra note 
5, at 1. 
131. Id. at 8. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
The Fatal Flaws of the “Sneak and Peek” Statute and How to Fix It 
155 
Return to the drug investigation described above. Police would like 
to enter the suspected home to confirm that drugs are present. They 
would also like to continue their investigation for another few weeks. If 
they conduct a regular search—notifying the occupants—but elect not 
to seize the evidence or arrest the suspects, there is a high likelihood 
that the suspects will destroy the evidence and escape. Of course, 
investigators would never do such a strange thing—conduct a search 
with notice yet elect not to seize the evidence or arrest the suspects. 
The point is that exigent circumstances inevitably arise—triggering the 
conditions for a covert search under § 3103a—in any case in which 
police wish to both conduct a search and continue the investigation. 
Thus, when police wish to conduct a covert search, § 3103a authorizes 
one—not just in exceptional cases, but in any case.  
The current statutory scheme does not require the police to show 
that there is some good reason to conduct the search now, rather than 
later, or that there is some important reason not to seize the evidence 
or arrest the suspects now, rather than later. The statute does not 
require police to justify their choice of investigative tactics—whether 
they will arrest the suspects during the search, or whether they will 
seize the evidence. In short, it allows police to create exigency in almost 
any case by conducting a premature search at a time when police do 
not want to seize evidence or arrest suspects. 
A review of the some of the delayed notice search warrant cases 
decided to date illustrates this problem. In United States v. 
Christopher,132 a police officer in St. Croix received a tip that a wooden 
shack, located on the property of Amobi Christopher, was being used 
to grow marijuana.133 On June 27, 2008, the officer obtained a delayed 
notice search warrant to permit a covert search of the shed at night, 
and to delay notice for thirty days. According to the affidavit, the 
reason for delayed notice was “to continue the investigation and to 
identify suspects.”134 The affidavit further stated that “providing 
immediate notification of the execution of the warrant will cause the 
target subjects to destroy evidence and conceal themselves from law 
enforcement.”135 Officers covertly entered and searched the shed, finding 
marijuana and growing equipment; they did not seize anything.136 Later 
police obtained a second delayed notice warrant, authorizing the 
installation of video recording equipment inside the shed. Finally police 
 
132. United States v. Christopher, No. 2008-0023, 2009 WL 903764 (D. V.I. 
Mar. 31, 2009).  
133. Id. at *1. 
134. Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant (on file with the author); 
Christopher, 2009 WL 903764, at *1. 
135. Christopher Aff. at 3.  
136. Christopher, 2009 WL 903764 at *1. 
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obtained a conventional search warrant, searched the shack, seized the 
marijuana, and arrested Christopher.137 
Note what the initial delayed notice search affidavit asserted and 
what it failed to assert. It stated that conducting a regular search with 
notice would cause the suspects to destroy evidence and hide. That 
seems obviously true. If the police searched the shack, provided notice 
to Christopher, and elected not to seize any evidence or arrest any 
suspects, there is every reason to believe Christopher would have 
destroyed (or moved) the evidence and also tried to escape himself.  
The affidavit does not explain why it was important to enter the 
shed on or around June 27, rather than waiting until the end of the 
investigation. It does not do so because § 3103a does not require this 
showing. The affidavit adequately explains the exigent circumstances—
created by the police—but totally fails to explain the necessity for the 
search.  
Had the police conducted the same investigation but omitted the 
covert search, it is hard to see how anything would have been different. 
They already had suspicion (indeed, probable cause) that there were 
drugs in the shack; the covert search merely confirmed those suspicions. 
The same marijuana plants observed during the final search would still 
have been there (as, indeed, they were).138 
The same problem is evident in United States v. Espinoza.139 In 
2004, federal and local authorities in Yakima, Washington, were 
investigating three suspected drug traffickers—brothers Gilberto, 
Gerardo, and Rigoberto Rivera.140 DEA Special Agent John Schrock 
suspected that Gilberto’s girlfriend, Alice Espinoza, was also involved 
in the conspiracy and that the traffickers were storing drugs, weapons, 
or other equipment in the outbuildings on Espinoza’s property at 1406 
South 12th Avenue in Yakima.141 Police had obtained wiretap orders 
for phone lines used by the Rivera brothers, which were set to expire 
on May 4, 2005, with a grand jury presentation to follow in June.142 On 
April 21, 2005, Agent Schrock sought a delayed notice search warrant 
 
137. Id. 
138. See id. If there was some compelling reason why this covert search was 
not merely convenient but also necessary, the affidavit does not describe 
it. And the affidavit does not give that reason (if it existed) because the 
statute does not require that it be given. 
139. United States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519 
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2005). 
140. Application and Affidavit of John R. Schrock; Espinoza, 2005 WL 3542519 
(2005) (No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS).  
141. Id. ¶ 33. 
142. Id. ¶ 34. 
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to search the outbuildings at Alice Espinoza’s 1406 South 12th Avenue 
home and to seize narcotics, weapons, or cash found therein.143  
Agent Schrock’s affidavit—and the justifications he gives for 
delayed notice—show the same flaw that was present in Christopher. 
In Espinoza, the affidavit stated that “[i]t is the desire of the Yakima 
DEA to obtain an order allowing for the search of the outbuildings at 
1406 S 12th Avenue, Yakima, Washington, and that notice and 
inventory not be made for a period of 60 days . . . in order to preserve 
the secrecy of the investigation.”144 Turning to the standards set out in 
§ 3103a and § 2705, Agent Schrock stated, “I believe that adverse 
results will happen should the investigation become known to the 
targets. It is feared that the targets will cease use of their telephones 
currently being monitored, destroy evidence, flee the jurisdiction or 
otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation.”145  
These two sentences are the entire explanation offered for the 
delayed notice request, and they appear to satisfy the statutory 
standard. The earlier parts of the affidavit detail an extensive 
investigation involving multiple officers and agencies, using wiretaps, 
extended human surveillance, and trash pulls. There is every reason to 
believe that if officers conducted an ordinary search of the outbuildings 
on or around April 21, 2005, but failed to arrest all of the suspects and 
search for all relevant evidence, the suspects would have escaped and 
destroyed or moved evidence. 
As in Christopher, however, there is no explanation in this 
paragraph for why it was important to conduct this covert search on or 
around April 21 rather than waiting until May or June, when 
investigators seemed ready to arrest all suspects and seize evidence. It 
is easy to see why conducting a regular search would disrupt the 
investigation—which is all the statute requires police to show. In 
contrast, it is hard to see why this covert search was necessary at all—
which the statute does not require police to explain.146   
143. Id. ¶¶ 34–36.  
144. Id. ¶ 34. 
145. Id. ¶ 35. 
146. Notably, the actual search warrant in Espinoza did not authorize a 
delayed notice search. Instead, apparently following boilerplate language, 
the search warrant commanded the searchers to “leav[e] a copy of this 
warrant and receipt for the person or property taken.” Espinoza, 2005 WL 
3542519 at *3; Defendant Alice Espinoza’s Motion to Suppress with 
Supporting Memorandum, Exhibit A (Search Warrant). The affidavit had 
expressly requested authority to delay notice by sixty days, and had given 
specific reasons (tracking the language of section 3013a and 2705) for the 
requested delay. Espinoza, 2005 WL 3542519, at *3. The failure of the 
warrant itself to authorize the delayed notice appears to have been an 
oversight—the government presented the trial court with “a declaration 
from Agent Schrock stating he had a telephone conversation with the 
issuing court and was told the warrant was a § 3103a warrant.” Id. The 
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The police in Espinoza also wanted to seize any drugs and guns 
they might find inside the outbuildings. Section 3103a requires a 
showing of “reasonable necessity” to justify a covert seizure.147 This 
aspect of the Espinoza case is discussed below, in Part V, dealing with 
covert seizures. 
In another case, United States v. Parrilla,148 DEA agents used a 
delayed notice search warrant to search a commercial building in Fort 
Lauderdale, Florida. Agents claimed that suspects, including Felix 
Parrilla, were involved in a drug conspiracy and that they were storing 
cocaine and related evidence in the building.149 
As for the need for a covert search, the affidavit stated that “there 
is reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification 
would seriously jeopardize the investigation.”150 Specifically, 
“notification of this warrant would reveal to Parrilla the existence of 
the current investigation,” and “members of drug trafficking 
organizations often change their methods of committing crimes once 
they learn of the existence of an investigation.”151 The agent stated that 
“if Parrilla were given notification of this warrant it would jeopardize 
the investigation occurring outside of this district.”152 
The agent further explained, “I seek only to search the premises for 
these items [cocaine and related contraband] to determine if they are 
present” at the location.153 She also requested authority to seize any 
contraband found—but made no attempt to explain the “reasonable 
necessity” that would justify that seizure. 
The magistrate judge issued the warrant and authorized covert 
entry and seizure of any contraband. The affidavit does not explain 
why a covert search was so important to the investigation. The affidavit 
seems to suggest that investigators simply wanted to confirm their 
suspicions, namely, that the commercial buildings were being used to 
store cocaine. 
 
warrant itself, however, failed to incorporate any of the affidavits, and 
expressly required notice. Id. at *4. As a result, the trial court held that 
the search violated the Fourth Amendment and the statute, and 
suppressed the resulting evidence. Id. 
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2) (2012). 
148. United States v. Parrilla, No. 13-cr-360-AJN, 2014 WL 2111680 
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2014). 
149. Affidavit of Agent Karen Berra at ¶ 12, Parrilla, 2014 WL 2111680 (No. 
1:13-cr-360-AJN). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. ¶ 11. 
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The same basic problem is evidence in earlier cases using a similar 
standard even though they were decided before § 3103a was enacted. 
In United States v. Villegas,154 police obtained a delayed notice warrant 
to search a rural New York farmhouse to confirm their suspicions that 
it was being used to manufacture cocaine.155 Eventually, after prolonged 
surveillance and additional investigation, the police raided the home 
with a conventional warrant, seizing evidence and arresting eleven 
occupants.156 Overall, the investigation was a great success. It also 
seems obvious that if police had conducted the earlier search with notice 
to the occupants—while declining to seize evidence or make any 
arrests—much evidence would have been destroyed and many suspects 
would have escaped. 
What is less clear is why the covert search was necessary. There is 
no suggestion that the covert search led police to uncover other leads 
or identify conspirators. Indeed, the Second Circuit said as much. After 
rejecting the defendant’s Fourth Amendment argument on the merits, 
the court added that even if the lack of notice was somehow unlawful, 
suppression would not be an appropriate remedy due to a lack of 
causation. That is to say, the eventual seizure of the drugs had not been 
caused by the earlier covert search. The court explained, “[w]e do not 
find in the record any suggestion that during the May 13 search the 
officers found any records or other writings that substantially assisted 
in their further investigations. What they gained from that search was 
confirmation rather than new leads.”157 The court thus had “no doubt” 
that “even without any inspection of the interior of the Johnnycake 
farm buildings,” investigators nonetheless had ample probable cause 
“for the issuance of a warrant to search and seize any evidence of a 
cocaine manufacturing operation at Johnnycake farm.”158  
The court made this point to explain why suppression was not an 
appropriate remedy. But at the same time, it suggests the covert May 
13 search was unnecessary. The covert search allowed police to confirm 
what they already suspected but did not allow them to find new leads 
or obtain any different evidence. If Villegas had been decided under 
§ 3103a, the result would have been the same. It is easy to conclude 
that the covert nature of the May 13 search prevented the destruction 
of evidence and the escape of suspects. The fact that there was no 
 
154. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990).  
155. Id. at 1330–31. 
156. Id. at 1331. 
157. Id. at 1338. 
158. Id.  
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evident need to conduct a search of any kind on May 13, covert or not, 
is not relevant under the “adverse result” test.159 
C. Justifying No-Knock Searches: Why Exigency Works 
The previous section explains why the doctrine of “exigent 
circumstances” fails, as a practical matter, to adequately regulate 
covert searching with delayed notice warrants. One final doctrinal 
puzzle is to consider why (or whether) the “exigent circumstances” 
doctrine does work in the context of no-knock searches when it fails 
completely in the context of covert searches. 
Both no-knock searches and covert searches are, in a sense, 
variations on the same theme. In both types of searches, investigators 
delay the notice that ordinarily must be given. In a no-knock entry, 
notice is delayed by seconds or minutes. Rather than knocking and 
announcing, police simply break open the door. Instead of receiving 
notice of the search a minute or so before entry, occupants receive notice 
at the moment police break open the door. With a covert search, in 
contrast, notice is delayed much longer—weeks or months. 
In practice, there is a very substantial difference between a very 
brief delay in notice and a lengthy delay, and that difference explains 
why these two practices should be regulated differently. While the 
“exigent circumstances” doctrine fails completely in the context of 
covert searches, it works reasonably well to regulate no-knock searches.  
No-knock searches are not advantageous to the police in all 
circumstances. Sometimes, a no-knock entry is dangerous to the police. 
If police simply break into a home violently, with no advance notice,  
159. The same can be said of the other Second Circuit case, United States v. 
Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1993). Police obtained a delayed 
notice search warrant to search a storage locker they suspected—
correctly—was being used to store methamphetamine precursor 
chemicals. Id. at 450–52. The warrant stated that giving notice of the 
search would “impede the investigation of a suspected felony.” Id. at 450. 
The officers conducted the covert search on April 18, 1989, taking pictures 
of chemicals in the storage locker. Id. The investigation continued, and 
on May 3, 1989, police executed a second delayed notice warrant, again 
taking pictures of chemicals in the storage locker. Id. at 451. On August 
8, police executed conventional search warrants, seized evidence, and 
arrested the suspects. Id. In evaluating the defendant’s suppression 
motion, the Second Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment contains no 
notice requirement at all. Id. at 455. Alternatively, however, the court 
again made an observation about causation: “there was no prejudice to 
Salcido because the search of his storage locker would have taken place in 
exactly the same way if Rule 41 had been followed with regard to notice 
of the entry.” Id. As in Villegas, this “prejudice” analysis seems to suggest 
that the surreptitious nature of the search in Pangburn was unnecessary. 
The covert searches did not result in developing any new evidence against 
co-conspirators (nor does it appear to have been designed to accomplish 
that goal). The searches simply appear to have allowed the officer to 
confirm that chemicals were present in the lockers. 
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there is some danger that the occupant will take up arms in self-defense, 
not knowing the intruders are police officers with lawful authority to 
search.160  
In addition, in many cases no-knock entry is pointless—it does 
nothing to aid the investigation. If police are executing a search warrant 
at a medical office in a health care fraud investigation, there is no reason 
to believe that one minute’s notice of the search would allow the 
occupants to destroy large file cabinets full of possible documentary 
evidence, or a medicine cabinet full of drugs. No-knock entry provides 
benefits to the police only in cases in which occupants with momentary 
advance notice could take some immediate action that would 
compromise the investigation. Given the prevalence of searches for 
small quantities of drugs, these cases are not so rare as they would have 
been in the past. But even so, there remain many cases in which there 
is simply no meaningful benefit, as a factual matter, to keeping the 
investigation secret for an additional minute. In that sense, no-knock 
searches are inherently self-limiting—albeit not as self-limiting as some 
would prefer. 
Covert searches do not share this self-limiting quality. Almost any 
criminal investigation stands to benefit if police can gather evidence 
without letting anyone know they are conducting an investigation. 
Once police begin gathering evidence through the use of searches and 
seizures, the suspects ordinarily become aware of the investigation. This 
does not necessarily mean the investigation must end, but it does 
immediately suggest to the suspects that any evidence that has not 
been found and seized should be disposed of quickly, and any suspects 
who have not been arrested should do their best to disappear. 
No-knock searches offer police the benefit of an additional minute 
or two of secrecy. That is a real benefit in some cases, but in many 
cases it provides little or no benefit at all. Covert searching with a 
delayed notice search warrant offers police the benefit of additional 
weeks or months of secrecy. That stands to be a benefit in many cases—
 
160. See, e.g., Launock v. Brown (1819), 106 Eng. Rep. 482, 483; 2 B. & Ald. 
592, 594 (“[H]ow is it possible for a party to know what the object of the 
person breaking open the door may be? He has a right to consider it as 
an aggression on his private property, which he will be justified in resisting 
to the utmost.”); United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“[A]llowing the police to attempt entry into a home before 
announcing their presence heightens the possibility that the occupants of 
a house will react violently against the unknown aggressor, particularly if 
they resemble highwaymen in ski masks.”). See Radley Balko, Overkill: 
The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America, Cato Inst. (2006), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/ 
overkill-rise-paramilitary-police-raids-america (last visited Oct. 1, 2014) 
(recounting examples of no-knock searches resulting in physical injury and 
death to occupants and/or the police). 
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almost any case in which the police seek to keep an investigation secret 
for any meaningful period of time.161  
Accordingly, limiting no-knock searches to cases of “exigent 
circumstances” is a meaningful limitation on that practice; there are 
many cases in which knocking and announcing, instead of conducting a 
no-knock search, will not risk the destruction of evidence or escape of 
suspects. The same is not true of covert searching. Accordingly, it is 
entirely appropriate to use a different standard to regulate covert 
searching than no-knock searching.  
 
* * * 
 
As the cases discussed above illustrate, the “exigent circumstances” 
doctrine is not the right tool for regulating covert searches. It threatens 
to overturn the ordinary Fourth Amendment presumption that a 
“reasonable” search is one conducted with notice and a demand for 
entry, instead rendering covert searching the norm. By limiting covert 
searches to cases of “exigent circumstances,” Congress actually failed 
to limit covert searches in any meaningful way at all. The rubric of 
“exigent circumstances” is simply inadequate, as a logical and practical 
matter, as a tool to limit covert searches. Something else is required. 
As suggested in the discussion above, there is a standard that would do 
a better job in limiting covert searches: necessity. 
 
161. This is not to say that police will conduct a covert search on a whim; on 
the contrary, covert searching is a risky and expensive proposition. But 
the risks of covert searching are different from the inherent limitations of 
no-knock searches. No-knock searches offer police only the very limited 
benefit of an extra minute or two of surprise; covert searching is a more 
powerful tool, in particular, in a long-term investigation. The risks of 
covert searches suggest that police will not use them constantly. There is 
always a danger that an occupant will unexpectedly return, or that an 
undetected person remains inside the house. Police risk exposing their 
secret investigation and even risk harm to themselves. In one episode of 
the HBO drama The Sopranos, police obtain a “sneak and peek” warrant 
to install a listening device in Tony Soprano’s basement. Much of the 
narrative tension of the episode comes from the almost comical efforts of 
police to track the routine movements of every member of the Soprano 
household and ensure that none of them will inadvertently return while 
the police are installing the device. The Sopranos, supra note 114. 
Currently there are no data on the number of “sneak and peek” searches 
conducted per year, due to the flaws in the reporting requirement passed 
by Congress in 2005. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 512–13. Thus it 
is not currently possible to say how common sneak and peek searches have 
become. In any event, a strong case remains that covert searching should 
be effectively regulated by a meaningful standard. 
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IV. A Better Way to Regulate Covert 
Searching: Necessity  
The solution to the constitutional and policy failures of § 3103a is 
to impose a strict “necessity” requirement, somewhat similar to the 
standard used in Title III, for all covert searches of physical spaces.162 
Several additional limitations might also make sense. Congress could 
require police seeking delayed notice search warrants to obtain 
authorization for the search from a high-level Department of Justice 
official—as with Title III wiretaps—to ensure that covert searches are 
sought only in cases of sufficient importance.163 In addition—as 
discussed below in Part V, relating to covert seizures—Congress could 
try to limit the types of cases in which delayed notice searches could be 
used, such as by permitting covert searches in drug cases only if the 
quantity or value of the suspected drugs exceeded some threshold 
amount. 
A. The Necessity Requirement  
Congress could ameliorate the too-permissive nature of the current 
standard by amending § 3103a to add a necessity requirement. In the 
meantime, courts must grapple with the reality—ignored to date—that 
delayed notice searches clearly implicate the Fourth Amendment’s “rule 
requiring notice.”164 The uniquely invasive nature of covert, delayed 
notice searches justifies heightened judicial scrutiny under the Fourth 
Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement. Based on the compelling 
analogy to Title III wiretaps, courts should require investigators to 
demonstrate “necessity” for the extreme intrusion of a covert entry.  
162. As explained below, I do not propose that Congress adopt the exact 
language or standard set forth in Title III, but rather articulate a necessity 
standard for covert searches based on the same basic concept as used in 
Title III. In an evaluation of the USA PATRIOT Act, Martha Minow 
hinted at a similar approach: “The Patriot Act’s authorization of ‘sneak-
and-peek’ warrants—allowing for delayed notification to the subject—also 
seems to violate the Fourth Amendment and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure absent a strong demonstration of need, at least for 
the broad scope permitted.” Martha Minow, What Is the Greatest Evil?, 
118 Harv. L. Rev. 2134, 2145 n.42 (2005) (reviewing Michael 
Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Entities in an Age of 
Terror (2004)). 
163. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1), federal officers seeking a Title III wiretap order 
must first obtain approval from the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney 
General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General. 
In practice, Title III wiretap applications are usually approved by a 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. See 
Electronic Surveillance Section 9.7.100, U.S. Attorney’s Manual, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam 
/title9/7mcrm.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
164. See Witmer-Rich, supra note 3, at 576–84. 
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Stated differently, if investigators do not demonstrate that a covert 
entry is necessary—pursued as a last resort—then the resulting search 
is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
The procedural mechanisms used to limit and regulate Title III 
wiretaps are a natural and logical place to find tools to regulate delayed 
notice search warrants. Both Title III wiretaps and delayed notice 
search warrants are forms of covert searching. In both cases, 
investigators invade private areas and gather information covertly, 
without letting the targets know of the search.  
As set forth in Part II, wiretapping requires a showing of “necessity” 
rather than exigent circumstances. The “exigent circumstances” 
doctrine is a poor tool to regulate wiretaps for the same reason it is a 
poor tool to regulate delayed notice search warrants—it ends up 
authorizing covert searches in far too many investigations. 
Instead of requiring a showing of “exigent circumstances,” police 
seeking Title III wiretaps must demonstrate, among other things, 
necessity for the wiretap order.165 The issuing judge must determine 
that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed 
or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if tried or be too dangerous.”166 
That is, investigators must show that the wiretap is a “last resort”—
the only reasonable way to obtain the evidence sought. The necessity 
requirement “assure[s] that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations 
where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the 
crime.”167  
 
165. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2012). 
166. Id. 
167. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974). In the Title III 
context, the necessity requirement has been subject to considerable 
judicial interpretation. Courts have said that: 
The affidavit in support of a search warrant must simply explain 
the retroactive or prospective failure of several investigative 
techniques that reasonably suggest themselves. However, a 
comprehensive exhaustion of all possible investigative techniques 
is not necessary before applying for a wiretap. The statute was 
not intended “to foreclose electronic surveillance until every other 
imaginable method of investigation has been unsuccessfully 
attempted, but simply to inform the issuing judge of the 
difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques.” 
 United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1214 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(citations omitted) (quoting and citing United States v. Van Horn, 789 
F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 
868 (11th Cir. 1984). See Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, 
Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surveillance in the Internet 
Age § 8:73 (3d ed. Supp. 2013). 
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A similar requirement should exist for covert, delayed notice 
searches.168 Covert searches are being used in cases in which there is not 
a sufficiently compelling government interest—in particular, in cases 
where ordinary investigative techniques could have achieved the same 
investigative goals. A necessity requirement would limit them to 
circumstances in which a covert entry is the only reasonable way to 
accomplish the investigative goals. 
The value of using “necessity” to regulate covert, delayed notice 
searching was recognized by the very first judge to confront the practice 
(at least in a published judicial opinion). In United States v. Freitas,169 
Judge Eugene Lynch, of the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, ruled that delayed notice search 
warrants were constitutionally permissible, but only within strict 
limits.170 Judge Lynch stated that “the privacy interests implicated here 
are substantial,” but “even highly intrusive searches may pass 
constitutional scrutiny provided there are sufficiently compelling 
reasons for the search and adequate safeguards to protect against 
potential abuse.”171  
Noting the absence of controlling authority on point, Judge Lynch 
analogized delayed notice warrants to Title III wiretaps, which likewise 
authorize a search without contemporaneous notice to the party being 
searched. The court highlighted several Title III procedural limitations: 
(1) “the requirement that an inventory of the intercepted 
communications be sent to the surveilled parties ‘within a reasonable 
time’ after the surveillance is terminated”; and (2) the “necessity” or 
“exhaustion” requirement “that ‘normal investigative procedures have 
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed if 
tried or [to] be too dangerous.’”172  
Several features in Judge Lynch’s analysis bear emphasis: (1) he 
concluded (correctly, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision eleven 
years later in Wilson v. Arkansas) that providing notice at the time of 
a search was a component of Fourth Amendment reasonableness (not 
 
168. Some commentators have criticized the implementation of § 2518(3)(c), 
arguing that courts have interpreted the Title III necessity rule too 
leniently. See, e.g., Carr & Bellia, supra note 73, at § 4:39. For that 
reason, and because the particular context of covert searching of physical 
spaces raises different Fourth Amendment and policy concerns than 
wiretapping, I argue for a legal standard similar but not identical to that 
in section 2518(3)(c). 
169. United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev’d, 800 
F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1986). 
170. Id. at 1570. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 1571 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1982) (notice); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(3)(c) (1982) (necessity)). 
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merely a requirement of Rule 41); (2) he recognized that delayed notice 
may be permissible constitutionally when circumstances warranted; (3) 
he analogized delayed notice search warrants to Title III wiretaps 
(another form of covert searching); and (4) he held that to be 
constitutionally permissible, a warrant authorizing a surreptitious 
search at the very least had to provide for some notice after the search 
and had to be shown to be necessary. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted all of these key points.173  
The Freitas case illustrates how the necessity requirement would 
limit covert searches. Much like the drug cases discussed above, in 
Freitas, a DEA agent sought a delayed notice warrant to search a home 
suspected to have a methamphetamine laboratory.174 The affidavit 
provided ample probable cause to believe this was true but did very 
little to explain the need for a delayed notice search. The affidavit 
stated that “[i]t would be advantageous for the investigation and safety 
of the surrounding residents if agents were able to enter 9839 Crestview 
Drive and determine the status of the laboratory, and any chemicals 
that may be present.”175 In a declaration filed much later, after the 
eventual suppression hearing, the DEA agent “said that the agents 
decided to apply for a covert entry warrant because ‘this would enable 
[them] to maintain the secrecy of the investigation and also confirm to 
a certainty [their] probable cause information that a lab was 
present.’”176 
The agents executed the delayed notice warrant on December 13, 
1984, searching the house at night when no one was present, and 
confirmed that there was a meth lab inside. Clearly, had the agents 
conducted the search when Freitas was present and then chosen not to 
seize any evidence or arrest Freitas, the result would have been both 
the destruction of evidence and the escape of the suspect.  
But there was no evidence that the agents had any real need to 
conduct a covert search. They had ample cause to believe there was a 
meth lab in the house. They took no action after the covert search to 
prevent possible environmental damage to the neighborhood. They did 
not obtain any leads inside the house during the covert search (and 
never claimed they were looking for any). After the covert search on 
December 13, they executed ordinary search warrants on several 
locations on December 20 and arrested Freitas. It appears that the 
investigation would have turned up precisely the same evidence and 
arrests had agents simply skipped the covert search on December 13. 
 
173. United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986). 
174. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. at 1563.  
175. Id. at 1564 (quoting Hayes Affidavit at ¶ 9).  
176. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1460 (9th Cir. 1986) (Poole, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Hayes Affidavit). 
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Judge Lynch, applying the “necessity” requirement he had 
determined should be used to govern delayed notice search warrants, 
explained that the affidavit “made no reference to the inadequacy of 
other investigative techniques apart from the surreptitious entry.”177 In 
light of that failure (and the failure to require even retrospective 
notice), the court had “no difficulty concluding that the surreptitious 
entry of the Clearlake residence violated the Fourth Amendment.”178 
A necessity requirement for covert searches makes sense for the 
same reasons that that standard is used for wiretaps. In both cases, 
investigators seek to deviate from the traditional Fourth Amendment 
presumption that notice must be given at the time of the search. To 
justify that deviation, investigators should be required to show that 
conventional Fourth Amendment techniques are inadequate—that the 
covert search is necessary.  
B. DOJ Authorization  
Another Title III limitation also makes sense for delayed notice 
search warrants. Before federal agents can seek a Title III wiretap order 
from a federal judge, they must obtain prior authorization from a high-
level official within the Department of Justice.179 This requirement 
ensures that wiretaps are used only in circumstances deemed sufficiently 
important to warrant involvement of a high-level DOJ official, and after 
some internal deliberation at higher levels of the department. 
Congress should require the same for covert, delayed notice 
searches. Like Title III wiretaps, covert searches of physical space 
represent a substantial intrusion into personal privacy. Both forms of 
covert searching impose a privacy cost on the entire community, as 
more and more individuals wonder whether their phones—or homes—
have been secretly searched by the government. Covert, delayed notice 
searches of physical space should be permitted only when officials at 
high levels of the Department of Justice consider the circumstances and 
determine that the investigative interest is sufficiently compelling to 
justify this invasive search tool. 
These two limitations—“necessity” and prior DOJ approval—strike 
a balance between permitting covert, delayed notice searches when the 
government interest is sufficiently compelling (because the search is 
necessary to accomplish investigative goals that are deemed important 
by high-level DOJ officials), while prohibiting the use of an invasive 
search technique when the government interest is not compelling 
(because the government investigative goals can be reasonably 
 
177. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. at 1571. 
178. Id. After two appeals to the Ninth Circuit, that court ultimately denied 
the defendant’s motion to suppress due to the Leon good faith exception. 
United States v. Freitas, 856 F.2d 1425, 1432 (9th Cir. 1988).  
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (2012). 
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accomplished without using a covert search, or the investigation is not 
sufficiently important to warrant DOJ involvement). 
C. The Misplaced Focus on Section 3103a’s “Catch-All” Provision  
Subsections (A)–(D) of § 3103a authorize delayed notice warrants 
in circumstances that closely resemble “exigent circumstances.” But 
even if “exigent circumstances” are not present, subsection (E) further 
authorizes delayed notice warrants whenever notice of a search would 
“otherwise seriously jeopardiz[e] an investigation.”180 Subsection (E) is 
on considerably shakier constitutional ground, as it departs clearly from 
the “exigent circumstances” doctrine.  
Accordingly, critics of delayed notice search warrants have often 
focused on this “catch-all” provision,181 and legislators seeking to curb 
the use of delayed notice search warrants have sought to repeal 
subsection (E).182 In some ways, subsection (E) is an appealing target, 
in part because, as explained above, this exception finds no support 
whatsoever in the common law exceptions to the “rule requiring notice.” 
In reality, however, this focus on subsection (E) is largely 
misplaced. Trying to fix § 3103a by eliminating subsection (E) is both 
too narrow and too broad a fix. Eliminating subsection (E) is not an 
adequate fix for the problems in § 3103a. As explained above, the 
exceptions listed in subsections (A)–(D) are already far too permissive, 
allowing covert searches in almost any case. At the same time, 
eliminating subsection (E) is too drastic a remedy because delayed 
notice warrants should be available in some cases that may not fit the 
traditional “exigent circumstances” doctrine. 
1. Eliminating Subsection (E) Does Not Correct the Problem. 
The first problem with focusing on subsection (E) is that repealing 
that subsection would not solve the core problem with the current 
regulatory scheme. As explained above, subsections (A)–(D)—roughly 
 
180. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(2)(E) (2012). 
181. See Nathan H. Seltzer, When History Matters Not: The Fourth 
Amendment in the Age of the Secret Search, 40 Crim. L. Bull. 105, 114 
(2004) (criticizing subsection (E) as “permit[ting] virtually limitless 
justifications by law enforcement authorities in their requests for delayed 
notification,” and claiming that “the fact that subsection (E) of the 
‘adverse result’ definition is borrowed from a different context[] renders 
the provision constitutionally suspect”).  
182. In 2003, Senator Russ Feingold introduced the “Reasonable Notice and 
Search Act,” designed to amend section 213 of the USA PATRIOT Act 
related to delayed notice searches. 149 Cong. Rec. S12,377 (daily ed. 
Oct. 2, 2003) (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold). Senator Feingold did not 
propose to eliminate delayed notice search warrants but to add several 
new limitations. Among other things, the bill would have eliminated the 
“catch-all” justification in subsection (E) (“seriously jeopardize an 
investigation or unduly delay a trial”), which Senator Feingold called “too 
easily susceptible to abuse.” Id. at 12,378. 
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speaking, the “exigent circumstances” doctrine—fail to meaningfully 
regulate delayed notice search warrants. Subsections (A)–(D) ask 
whether giving notice of a search will lead to destruction of evidence or 
escape of suspects. If the police choose to conduct a search without 
seizing the evidence or arresting the suspects, the answer to that 
question will almost always be yes. Subsections (A)–(D) do not ask 
police to give the justification that should be demanded—namely, why 
police think it is so important to conduct a covert search now, rather 
than an ordinary search later when the investigation is concluding. 
Repealing subsection (E) obviously does not correct the problem of 
using the exigent circumstances doctrine in the first place. 
Thus, even if subsection (E) were repealed, subsections (A)–(D) 
would continue authorizing covert searches in a broad range of cases 
where these invasive searches are unnecessary and unjustified. Recall 
the Christopher case and others like it. A DEA investigator has 
probable cause to believe marijuana is being grown in a shed on a 
particular piece of property. The investigator wants to search the shed 
and determine whether marijuana is present. At the same time, the 
agent wants the investigation to remain secret, to give the agent more 
time to identify the suspects who might be associated with the shed.183 
If investigators conducted a traditional search of the shed, it would tip 
off the suspects. Those suspects might destroy any other evidence of 
the drug crime and might also try to flee before they can be identified 
by law enforcement. The exigencies of preventing the destruction of 
evidence and preventing the escape of a suspect are both present in this 
example. Even though the scenario above satisfies subsections (A)–(D), 
these facts do not show whether a covert search is truly necessary or 
important to the investigation. Thus, even if subsection (E) were 
repealed, a fundamental problem would remain with subsections (A)–
(D). 
That objection alone does not suffice to show that subsection (E) 
should be preserved or that it is not worthy of at least some of the 
criticism that has been lodged against it. It could be the case that 
subsection (E) should be repealed, and subsections (A)–(D) should also 
be amended. On the contrary, I argue that repealing subsection (E) 
would be a mistake, as there are some important circumstances in which 
a covert search is important and necessary, and yet might not be 
authorized under subsections (A)–(D). 
 
183. These facts are based roughly on those forming the basis of United States 
v. Christopher, No. 2008-0023, 2009 WL 903764 (D. V.I., Mar. 31, 2009). 
The basic nature of these facts is also similar to those in, for example, 
United States v. Freitas, 610 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United 
States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir. 1990); and United States v. 
Hernandez, 2007 WL 2915856 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2007). 
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2. Eliminating Subsection (E) May Prohibit Covert Searching in Some 
Cases in Which It Serves a Compelling Government Interest. 
Subsection (E) should not be eliminated because there are some 
circumstances in which the government need for a covert search is both 
substantial and compelling, and which may be authorized only by 
subsection (E) and not by subsections (A)–(D). Subsections (A)–(D) 
cover most of the reasons investigators would like to conduct a covert 
search. The paradigmatic “terror cell” case, in which the government 
conducts a covert search to discover and disrupt an imminent terrorist 
plot, without prematurely tipping off the members of the terror cell, 
falls comfortably under subsections (A) and (B): without a covert 
search, the members of the terror cell might escape (subsection (B)) 
and re-form later to carry out another attack (subsection (A)). 
The one recurring case that does not necessarily fit under 
subsections (A)–(D) is the need to protect an ongoing wiretap. The 
DOJ has given several examples of cases in which a covert search is 
justified by the desire to find (and perhaps seize) evidence while 
protecting an existing wiretap.184 In this type of case, investigators want 
to find and possibly seize evidence but fear that if they do so (with 
notice), persons involved in the illegal conduct will cease 
communicating—at least incriminating communications—over 
wiretapped phone lines. These cases may not necessarily involve risk to 
any person, or the destruction of (existing) evidence, or the escape of 
suspects. Instead, the risk may simply be that persons who have been 
talking on a tapped phone line will stop conducting incriminating 
conversations on that phone line.  
This danger does not seem to fit under the justifications listed in 
subsections (A)–(D). The closest provision is subsection (C)—
“destruction of or tampering with evidence.” One could argue that this 
provision, read broadly, could cover the risk of compromising a wiretap. 
Compromising a wiretap can be said to involve the “destruction of 
evidence” in the sense that evidence that would come into existence in 
the future—future conversations—will never materialize. It is not clear 
whether courts would accept this somewhat strained reading of 
subsection (C). Arguably, the concept of “destruction of evidence” 
implies that evidence already exists and that evidence will be lost or 
destroyed.185 It is unclear whether the loss of potential future 
incriminating statements by wary suspects involves destroying 
evidence. 
 
184. See infra Part IV.C.2.  
185. In the context of Title III wiretapping, Daniel Cook interpreted the 
“destruction of evidence” test narrowly: “Obviously, evidence could not 
be destroyed if notice were given prior to the execution of the order since 
the ‘evidence’ does not yet exist. . . . If presearch notice were given, no 
evidence would be destroyed; it simply would not materialize . . . .” Cook, 
supra note 83, at 581.  
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Protecting an existing wiretap is plainly authorized by subsection 
(E). Danger to an existing wiretap is a circumstance that might 
seriously jeopardize an investigation, even in the absence of danger to 
any person, danger of escape, risk of destruction of evidence, or possible 
witness intimidation. 
Protecting a wiretap is also a sufficiently important government 
interest, at least in some cases, to justify a covert search. The 
paradigmatic terror cell case could easily fit this pattern. Suppose 
investigators seek to conduct a covert search of the location of a 
suspected terror cell. Investigators also have an existing wiretap on the 
phone of a key suspect. The covert search (and possibly seizure of 
evidence) could allow investigators to gather critical evidence to 
prevent a terrorist attack while preserving the integrity of an existing 
wiretap that can be used to determine the identity of suspects and prove 
their involvement in the terror plot. 
In sum, the need to protect an existing wiretap is at least sometimes 
a sufficiently compelling government interest to justify a covert search 
and/or seizure. That concern may not be adequately covered by 
subsections (A)–(D) and is most evidently authorized by subsection 
(E). Repealing subsection (E), then, would jeopardize the government’s 
ability to conduct covert searches for the purpose of protecting an 
existing wiretap, even when doing so is justified by the most compelling 
of circumstances. 
Subsection (E) is the wrong target for those seeking to reform the 
practice of covert searching under § 3103a. Repealing subsection (E) 
would both accomplish far too little—as subsections (A)–(D) currently 
authorize covert searches in many unnecessary cases—and accomplish 
too much—potentially eliminating the ability to use covert searches to 
discover important evidence while protecting existing wiretaps. 
V. Regulating Covert Seizures 
Covert seizures of physical evidence and contraband carry 
additional problems not present with covert searches. The current 
statute prohibits any seizures during covert searches unless the court 
specifically authorizes one based on a showing of “reasonable necessity” 
for the seizure.186 The statute fails to recognize or regulate a very 
significant danger involved in covert seizures—retaliatory violence 
against third parties. In addition, the “reasonable necessity” standard 
is not very helpful in identifying which types of covert seizures are 
sufficiently important to justify these risks. 
A. Mitigating the Danger to Third Parties 
Covert seizures create at least one serious danger not present with 
covert searches. If a covert seizure is successful, the owner of the seized 
 
186. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2) (2012). 
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property will believe the property has been stolen in a burglary, not 
seized by the government. The seized items will almost always be 
contraband, and thus the target of the seizure will not report the crime 
to the police but may well seek private remedies—retaliation against 
the suspected burglars.187  
The current statute does not acknowledge this problem or direct 
investigators or courts to deal with it, creating another constitutional 
defect in § 3103a. A search and seizure that predictably prompts the 
target to retaliate against innocent third parties is an “unreasonable” 
search. Courts issuing delayed notice warrants that authorize covert 
seizures should press investigators to explain whether the covert seizure 
creates a risk of harm to third parties and also to explain what measures 
will be taken to minimize that harm. Congress should amend § 3103a 
to specifically require a consideration of this danger. 
At least one court has recognized the danger posed by covert 
seizures. In United States v. Espinoza,188 the court granted a motion to 
suppress the fruits of a covert search because the search warrant did 
not authorize it.189 The court’s analysis focused on the warrant’s facial 
deficiency under § 3103a and did not dwell much on the details of the 
actual search. At the end of the opinion, however, the court made some 
brief but intriguing comments on the potential dangers of a delayed 
notice search staged to look like a break-in.  
The court explained that “[t]he officers left a California license plate 
in order to divert any suspicion from law enforcement and toward other 
individuals.”190 The court stated that this tactic—typical in covert 
seizures—“has the dangerous potential of injuring innocent third 
persons. When an individual discovers that others have been on their 
property uninvited, there exists a natural desire to learn who the 
intruder was . . . .”191 When investigators seize property and stage a 
 
187. A fictional example comes from The Wire. After Omar Little robs a drug 
stash run by the Avon Barksdale gang, Barksdale puts a bounty on the 
head of the robbers and says he wants their dead bodies to be displayed 
publicly: 
 Barksdale: “I want that mother—er on display. We send a message to the 
courtyard about this mother—er. So people know we ain’t playin’.” 
 Wee-Bey: “Yeah, we got peoples on it.” 
 The Wire: Old Cases (HBO television broadcast June 23, 2002).  
188. United States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519 
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2005). 
189. Id. at *5. In the search warrant affidavit, the investigators had requested 
a delayed notice search warrant under § 3103a. The warrant itself, 
however, did not actually authorize delayed notice. Id.  
190. Id. 
191. Id.  
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burglary, “it creates the potential for innocent people being injured 
because the owners of the property may incorrectly blame and sanction 
in some way a person innocent of the seizure.”192 Indeed, the court noted 
that the Title III wiretap had produced evidence of just such a risk: 
“[t]he transcripts of recorded telephone conversations demonstrate that 
the Riveras had focused on the brother of Ms. Espinoza exposing him 
to danger of injury . . . .”193  
Another case similarly illustrates this danger, and shows that 
investigators sometimes use covert seizures for precisely this purpose—
to provoke conspirators into action—thereby providing further evidence 
of their criminal conduct. In United States v. Miranda,194 the Eleventh 
Circuit described a “sneak and peek” search accompanied by a covert 
seizure.195 During an investigation into a drug conspiracy, police learned 
the location of the stash house. Agents conducted a “sneak and peek” 
search of the house at 4:45 a.m. and seized three pounds of 
methamphetamine with a street value of around $24,000–$30,000.196  
Remarkably, the very purpose of this covert seizure appears to have 
been to provoke the members of the conspiracy: “By staging a burglary, 
the agents hoped to precipitate activity within the Cuevas conspiracy 
that would provide additional evidence of criminal conduct.”197 This 
tactic was successful:  
The ruse had the desired effect. Mr. Cuevas discussed the 
apparent theft of the methamphetamine from the 499 Alcott 
Street stash house with Jesus Alvear Uribe. . . . Mr. Uribe 
suggested that Mr. Mojica was the thief. Mr. Cuevas suspected 
that the culprit was a man who had been employed to wash the 
methamphetamine at the 499 Alcott Street stash house. After the 
entry into the 499 Alcott Street stash house and the apparent 
theft of methamphetamine, Mr. Cuevas moved his 
methamphetamine and cocaine operation to Apartment 29G.198 
The court does not discuss the matter further, but these facts illustrate 
the concerns raised by the Espinoza court. After the members of a large-
scale drug conspiracy discover what they believe to be a burglary of 
$30,000 worth of drugs, they predictably begin analyzing who  
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. United States v. Miranda, 425 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2005).  
195. Id. The covert search and seizure were not challenged on appeal, so the 
Eleventh Circuit described them in passing but did not analyze the 
legality of the search or seizure. 
196. Id. at 956. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
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committed the burglary. This discussion may have several purposes—
including prevention of additional thefts—but one of those purposes 
was no doubt to consider retaliation against the suspected thief. 
The current statute does not recognize this danger or take any steps 
to address it. Covert seizures under § 3103a do require an additional 
showing beyond that required for covert searches. Delayed notice 
warrants issued under § 3103a must “prohibit[] the seizure of any 
tangible property . . . except where the court finds reasonable necessity 
for the seizure.”199 The statute does not define “reasonable necessity,” 
and there is no case law to date interpreting this requirement.200 Given 
the lack of a statutory definition and the “reasonable” adjective, it is 
unlikely that courts would interpret this requirement as equivalent to 
the Title III “necessity” standard in § 2518(1)(c). 
Courts, as well as Congress, must address this problem. 
Investigators should be required to confront this issue head-on in any 
application for a covert seizure of tangible goods—to explain whether 
the covert seizure will create any risk of harm to third parties, and to 
explain what measures they will take to mitigate that harm. A court 
should not authorize covert seizures unless it is satisfied that any risk 
of harm to third parties is outweighed by some substantial government 
interest in the seizure requested. Part VI below proposes specific 
statutory language for this requirement. 
B. Requiring a Substantial Government Interest for Covert Seizures 
Covert seizures present another problem in addition to the danger 
of retaliation against third parties. If the object of a covert search is 
fungible goods—such as drugs or cash—police may be able to easily 
demonstrate “necessity” as well as “exigent circumstances” in almost 
any case. That may be true even in cases in which the goods in question 
are not uniquely valuable to the investigation and do not pose any 
substantial danger to the public. 
Suppose police suspect a college student is selling small quantities 
of marijuana from his dorm room. They would like to continue their 
investigation for another week or two to permit them to try to identify 
other conspirators, and perhaps to identify the student’s supplier. Police 
seek a delayed notice warrant to search the dorm room while he is away 
and also seek permission to seize any marijuana and any cash they find. 
Under existing statute, how would this request fare? 
 
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2) (2012). 
200. Espinoza is the only case to mention it, and the court there does not 
discuss or define the term. United States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-
EFS, 2005 WL 3542519 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2005). The requirement to 
show “reasonable necessity” for covert seizures was not included in the 
Bush Administration’s original proposed legislation, but it was added by 
Congress before passing the USA PATRIOT Act. 147 Cong. Rec. S10,547 
(daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).  
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It is easy to see how a search with notice given to the student would 
prompt him to destroy evidence. If police search his dorm room and 
confirm the presence of marijuana, it is near certain that the suspect, 
after the police leave, will then destroy or dispose of the marijuana. 
Thus it is easy to show “exigent circumstances” to justify the covert 
search.  
Can the police also show “reasonable necessity” for the covert 
seizure? Assume police plan on conducting a covert search on one 
date—say, April 10—but do not plan on seizing any evidence or 
arresting the suspect until ten days later. It is likely that any marijuana 
they see on April 10 will no longer be there by April 20. That is true 
even if they are confident that some marijuana, most likely in a similar 
quantity, will be present on April 20. The particular marijuana they see 
on April 10 will almost certainly be long gone—up in smoke—by April 
20. Thus police might claim “reasonable necessity” for the seizure: if 
they do not seize this marijuana during the April 10 covert search, it 
will be gone—used or distributed to third parties—by the time of the 
later search. 
The result is the same even under the proposed “necessity” 
standard. Assume police must show that normal investigative 
techniques do not suffice—that the evidence cannot be obtained 
without a covert search and seizure. Police can explain, correctly, that 
any particular marijuana they might find on April 10 is not likely to be 
present on April 20, and thus ordinary investigative techniques would 
not suffice to obtain that evidence. Thus in any case in which 
investigators are looking for fungible goods—such as drugs or guns—
they may be able to readily show that a covert seizure is “necessary.” 
That is true even in cases, like our small-time marijuana dealer, in 
which there does not appear to be any compelling government interest 
that justifies the extraordinary measures of a covert search and seizure.  
Search warrant affidavits in covert seizure cases illustrate this 
problem. In Espinoza, the agents sought permission to conduct a covert 
seizure in addition to the covert search. The affidavit does not use the 
phrase “reasonable necessity” but nonetheless appears to be drafted to 
satisfy that (rather amorphous) standard. The affidavit states that 
seizure of any drugs should be permitted “to protect the public from 
the distribution of the same; to preserve the evidence as the nature of 
this drug organization is to move the inventory, and because it is 
obvious contraband.”201 The affidavit also sought permission to seize 
any weapons found during the covert search “to protect the public from 
the use of the firearms in relation to drug trafficking crimes.”202 Finally, 
 
201. Affidavit in Support of Search and Seizure Warrant at 14 ¶ 36, United 
States v. Espinoza, No. CR-05-2075-7-EFS, 2005 WL 3542519 (E.D. 
Wash. Dec. 23, 2005) (M-05-4073-00). 
202. Id. 
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the affidavit sought permission to seize any currency found near any 
illegal drugs, because “the currency is related to illicit narcotics 
trafficking and its fungible nature makes it unlikely that it would be 
present when the case is concluded.”203 
This paragraph seems to show “reasonable necessity” for the 
seizure, even if “necessity” in this context is understood in the relatively 
strict Title III sense (and it is not clear that courts interpret it that 
strictly), requiring a showing that there is no other reasonable way to 
get this evidence through ordinary investigative techniques. In cases 
like this—almost any drug investigation—a covert seizure, unlike a 
covert search, really does provide police with evidence they would not 
otherwise obtain without compromising the investigation. The problem 
is that, in some cases, that fact may seem important enough to justify 
a covert seizure, whereas in other cases, it may not. For example, in a 
case involving a large quantity of drugs, a covert seizure may be 
justified to prevent the distribution of a large quantity of drugs into 
the black market. In contrast, in a case involving a small quantity of 
drugs, such as a small amount of marijuana, a covert seizure may not 
be justified. The “necessity” standard does not distinguish between the 
two types of cases. 
There are several possible ways to try to solve this problem. 
Congress could draw a specific line, authorizing covert searches and 
seizures in drug cases only when the drugs in question cross a specified 
threshold. For example, Congress could provide that covert seizures of 
drugs are permitted only when the quantity suspected is above that 
provided in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).204 This would permit investigators 
to request a covert seizure of drugs only when they believe they would 
remove a substantial quantity of drugs from the stream of commerce—
under § 841(b)(1)(A), at least 1 kilogram of heroin, 5 kilograms of 
cocaine, 280 grams of crack, or other specified drug-specific quantities.205  
The benefit of this approach is to provide a bright-line limit below 
which any drugs that might be present are in small enough quantities 
as to not justify the risks and privacy invasions of a covert seizure. It 
may be unwieldy, however, to use specific drug quantities as a cut-off 
for covert search and seizure authority because investigators often may 
not know the drug quantities involved at the time they seek the 
warrant.  
203. Id. 
204. Section 841(b)(1)(A) lists drug quantities, by type of drug, for the 
purposes of federal sentencing and mandatory minimums. These drug-
specific quantities listed in § 841(b)(1) represent an existing measure of 
the relative “seriousness” of various types of controlled substances. 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012).  
205. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). If Congress wanted to draw the line differently, it 
could instead authorize covert seizures in cases involving amounts listed 
in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B): at least 100 grams of heroin, 500 grams of 
cocaine, 28 grams of crack, and so on. 
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Another approach would be to require investigators to show, and 
the court to find, that a covert seizure would further a “substantial 
government interest.” Instead of creating a bright line, this requirement 
would push investigators to explain why a covert seizure is so important 
and allow courts to exercise some case-specific judgment about what 
circumstances present sufficiently important government interests to 
justify a covert search and seizure. 
VI. Proposed Legislation 
This Article has identified a number of flaws in the existing delayed 
notice search warrant statute and explained some of the revisions that 
would better regulate the practice. There is good reason to believe that 
Congress, in § 3103a, sought to create a uniform standard for covert 
searches of physical space, one that would permit the practice in 
exceptional cases involving compelling government interests but that 
would not authorize the practice in any routine case. The following 
proposed revisions better reflect this legislative goal. The proposed 
revisions appear in italics. Explanatory commentary appears in 
footnotes.  
 
Proposed Section 3103a 
(b) Delay.— With respect to the issuance of any warrant or court 
order under this section, or any other rule of law, to search for and seize 
any property or material that constitutes evidence of a criminal offense 
in violation of the laws of the United States, any notice required, or 
that may be required, to be given may be delayed if— 
(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing 
immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an 
adverse result (as defined in section 2705, except if the adverse results 
consist only of unduly delaying a trial); 
(2) in the case of a physical search (as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 
1821(5))206, the court finds: 
(i) that the application for delayed notice has been approved by one 
of the officials listed in section 2516(1) of Title 18207; and  
206. As noted in Part V, the fundamental problems related to covert searches 
identified in this Article involve physical searches, not other types of 
covert searches such as GPS monitoring or obtaining digital records. 
Another federal statute—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA)—already differentiates between searches of physical spaces and 
other types of searches. 50 U.S.C. § 1821(5) (2012). Thus, FISA’s 
statutory definition of a “physical search” is used here.  
207. This section is part of the Title III wiretapping statute. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2516(1) (2012). It lists the following officials who can authorize an 
application for a Title III wiretap and, as incorporated here, who can 
authorize an application for a delayed notice search warrant involving a 
physical search: 
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(ii) that the objectives of the search cannot substantially be 
accomplished through normal investigative procedures (including a later 
search conducted with contemporaneous notice);208  
(3) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible property, any 
wire or electronic communication (as defined in section 2510), or, except 
as expressly provided in chapter 121, any stored wire or electronic 
information, except where the court finds reasonable necessity for that 
the seizure will serve a substantial government interest;  
(4) in the case that a seizure of tangible property is authorized, and 
that seizure of tangible property creates a risk of serious physical harm 
to any person (through retaliation or otherwise), the court finds: 
(i) that the government has proposed procedures that will minimize 
that risk; and 
(ii) that the government interest in the covert seizure outweighs any 
risk of serious physical harm to any person; 
(5) in the case of a seizure of controlled substances, the court finds 
that the controlled substances likely to be seized meet or exceed the 
quantities listed in section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 18;  
and 
(6) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice within a 
reasonable period not to exceed 30 days after the date of its execution, 
or on a later date certain if the facts of the case justify a longer period 
of delay. 
Conclusion 
Covert searching is a dangerous tool. It allows the government to 
secretly enter the sanctuary of the home, which stands at the center of 
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure. Covert government intrusion into the home carries serious 
privacy costs; “[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”209 At the same time, covert 
searching can be a critical law enforcement tool, permitting police to 
 
The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate 
Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting 
Assistant Attorney General, or any Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General or acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the 
Criminal Division or National Security Division specially 
designated by the Attorney General . . . .  
 Id. 
208. This language is meant to reflect a similar “necessity” standard as appears 
in the wiretapping context. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012). The proposal 
does not use the exact language of § 2518(1)(c) but instead seeks to invoke 
the underlying concept of “necessity” in the particular context of covert 
searches of physical spaces. 
209. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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maintain the secrecy of an investigation while discovering crucial 
information or securing dangerous contraband. 
The deeply invasive nature of covert searching requires a compelling 
government justification, and covert searches should be reserved for 
cases of true necessity. The current legal rules governing delayed notice 
search warrants are conceptually flawed. The statute uses a legal 
doctrine—“exigent circumstances”—that does not make logical sense 
when applied to covert searching of physical spaces and which permits 
investigators to conduct a covert search in almost any case they would 
find it convenient or helpful. Covert searches without sufficient 
justification run afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s “rule requiring 
notice” and are constitutionally unreasonable.  
Courts must recognize the Fourth Amendment interests implicated 
by covert searching and demand more exacting justifications. Congress 
should revise the delayed notice search warrant statute, requiring police 
to demonstrate true necessity for a covert search—a showing that 
conducting a covert search is the only way to obtain evidence that 
cannot reasonably be obtained through conventional (and less invasive) 
investigative techniques. In addition, Congress should require 
investigators to obtain high-level approval from within the DOJ, to 
ensure that covert searches are conducted only in cases of sufficient 
importance and not in run-of-the-mill criminal investigations. Congress 
should also revise the statute to regulate the serious risk of physical 
harm that arises from the dangerous practice of covert seizures staged 
to look like burglaries. 
With these revisions, covert searches and seizures can be limited to 
cases of sufficient importance and necessity, thus rendering them 
constitutionally reasonable. 
 
